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The Enigma of Photography, Depiction, 
and Copyright Originality 
Terry S. Kogan* 
Photography is an enigma. The features that distinguish it most 
from other art forms—the camera’s automatism and the photograph’s 
verisimilitude—have throughout its history also provided the basis for 
critics to claim that a photographer is not an artist nor the photograph a 
work of art. Because every photograph is the product of an automatic, 
mechanical device, critics argue that a photographer is a mere technician 
relegated to clicking a shutter button. Moreover, because every photo-
graph displays an exact likeness of whatever happened to be sitting before 
the camera, critics consider that image to be a factual document devoid of 
creativity. Looking to the technology’s automatism and verisimilitude, 
modern legal skeptics have joined this chorus by arguing that most photo-
graphs are inevitably uncreative facts—in the words of one scholar, the 
“automated representation of reality”—and thereby undeserving of 
copyright protection. 
This is the first Article to propose that borrowing the concept of de-
piction from art theory can shed considerable light on photographic origi-
nality. As a depiction, a photograph has what philosopher Richard 
Wollheim has described as “two folds.” The “first fold” refers to the 
design markings on the surface of the photographic paper. The “second 
fold” refers to the real world object or scene that a viewer perceives in 
those design markings. This Article’s fundamental thesis is that, for 
purposes of copyright law, a photograph’s originality inheres primarily 
in a photographer’s creative choices that result in the placement of sur-
face design markings. In contrast, the object or scene that a viewer sees in 
a photograph rarely impacts the image’s originality. Accordingly, the 
claim by legal skeptics that most photographs are uncreative facts locates 
photographic originality in the wrong place—in the object or scene that a 
viewer sees in the picture (depiction’s second fold). If, instead, a photo-
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graph’s originality depends primarily on a photographer’s creative 
choices in placing surface design markings (depiction’s first fold), the 
attack on originality based on automatism and verisimilitude—on a 
photograph’s inevitably being an uncreative fact—collapses. 
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The camera, in all its manifestations, is our god, dispensing what we 
mistakenly take to be truth. The photograph is the modern world. 
Thomas Lawson, Last Exit: Painting1 
INTRODUCTION 
Photography is an enigma. The features that distinguish it most 
from other art forms—the camera’s automatism and the photo-
graph’s verisimilitude—have throughout its history also provided 
the basis for critics to claim that a photographer is not an artist nor 
the photograph a work of art. From the moment that the Supreme 
Court first considered photographic originality in the 1880s to the 
present day, copyright law has been infected by the enigma of pho-
tography. 
Every photograph is the product of an automatic device—the 
camera. Unlike a painter whose every brushstroke is mediated 
through her mental vision, critics cast a photographer as a mere 
technician relegated to clicking a shutter button. Her creative in-
tentions play little part in the appearance of the final image.2 More-
over, every photograph is infused with verisimilitude—perfect 
truthfulness. Because that image inevitably displays an exact like-
ness of whatever happened to be sitting before the camera, critics 
assert that a photograph merely records facts about the world and 
                                                                                                                            
1 Thomas Lawson, Last Exit: Painting, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING 
REPRESENTATION 162 (Brian Wallis ed., 9th ed. 1999). 
2 See discussion infra Part III.A; see also MARY WARNER MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY xiv (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY] (“The 
camera seemed to have the unique ability to soak up large quantities of visual detail. 
Therefore, its images were judged to be far less subjective than those made by other 
methods.”). 
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thereby lacks even the minimal creativity necessary to be consi-
dered an artwork.3 
In fact, during the first decade after photography’s appearance 
in 1839, these two features were the source not of denigration but 
of high praise. Described by one of its pioneers as “impressed by 
Nature’s hand,”4 “not a process invented by humans,”5 photogra-
phy’s automatic nature captured the public’s imagination.6 Moreo-
ver, the image’s utter truthfulness led many to view the technology 
as providing an externalized, ideal human vision.7 “[P]hotography 
was said to be a wonder, a freak of nature, a new art, a threshold 
science, and a dynamic instrument of democracy.”8 
As photographs became commonplace after the mid-nineteenth 
century, the public’s fascination with photography gave way to 
more critical views.9 Though photography was establishing itself as 
a powerful tool for scientists, critics attacked the camera’s auto-
matism as cheapening the photographer’s relationship to nature,10 
and considered the image’s verisimilitude to be “too truthful” to 
be art.11 
When in 1884, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,12 the 
Supreme Court first considered whether the photographer could be 
considered an Author and the photograph a Writing for purposes of 
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause,13 the debate over photogra-
                                                                                                                            
3 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
4 W.H.F. TALBOT, THE PENCIL OF NATURE, Introductory Remarks 2 (Da Capo Press 
ed., 1969); see also 2 SAMUEL F.B. MORSE, HIS LETTERS AND JOURNALS 144 (Edward Lind 
Morse ed., 1914) (“Nature . . . has taken the pencil into her own hands, and she shows 
that the minutest detail disturbs not the general repose.”). 
5 MARY WARNER MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY AND ITS CRITICS—A CULTURAL HISTORY 3 
(1997) [hereinafter MARIEN, CRITICS]. 
6 See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
8 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 2. 
9 See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
10 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 94. 
11 Francis Frith, The Art of Photography, 5 ART J. 72 (1859), quoted in MARIEN, 
PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 77. 
12 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
13 The basis for granting copyright protection lies in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
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phy’s art status had been raging for four decades. It was therefore 
not surprising that, in appealing the lower court’s determination 
that it had infringed on Napoleon Sarony’s copyright in a photo-
graph of Oscar Wilde, Burrow-Giles attacked that image’s original-
ity based on the camera’s mechanics and the photograph’s truth-
fulness.14 
The story is now oft told of how in Burrow-Giles the Supreme 
Court sidestepped these thorny issues by grounding photographic 
originality in pre-shutter choices of the photographer related to 
posing and staging the tableau.15 Over the past 125 years, courts 
have expanded the range of a photographer’s pre-shutter choices 
on which a photograph’s originality can be based.16 As a result, 
courts now find that “[a]lmost any photograph ‘may claim the ne-
cessary originality to support a copyright.’”17 
Nonetheless, contemporary legal scholars remain highly skep-
tical of photographic originality.18 Several argue that most photo-
                                                                                                                            
their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Burrow-Giles, 111 
U.S. at 53, 55. 
14 For example, Burrow-Giles argued that, because a photograph is the result of the 
“chemical forces of light,” Statement and Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 15, Burrow-Giles, 
111 U.S. 53 (No. 1071) [hereinafter Burrow-Giles’s Brief], the photographer contributes 
“no intellectual labor,” only “mechanical skill.” Id. at 10. It further argued that a 
“photograph . . . is always a reproduction true to nature,” id. at 21 (emphasis in original), 
and therefore devoid of the creativity required for copyright protection; see also discussion 
infra Part II.B. 
15 See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the 
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 427 (2004) (“The Court located this 
human trace in the pre-shutter activities.”); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s 
Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 356 
(2011–2012); Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and 
Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1499 (2011). 
16 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Elements of originality 
in a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and 
camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant involved.”); see also 
discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
17 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing 
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][1] 
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.)). 
18 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 374 (“[A] large percentage of the world’s 
photographs are likely not protected by American copyright law because the images lack 
even a modicum of creativity ….”); Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping the World Safe 
from Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refrigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art Images in the Public 
Domain Through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital Reproductions, 21 HASTINGS COMM. 
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graphs run afoul of the fundamental axiom that copyright law pro-
tects only creative expression, not facts or ideas.19 Not surprisingly, 
this attack is based squarely on the enigmatic features of the tech-
nology, the camera’s automatism and the image’s verisimilitude. 
For example, viewing a photograph as the “automated representa-
tion of reality,”20 Professor Justin Hughes asserts that, as “infor-
mation-laden nature of photographs”21 and “simple conveyors of 
truth,”22 most photographs are uncreative facts not entitled to 
copyright protection.23 
This Article proposes that introducing the concept of depiction 
from art theory into copyright law can cast significant light on pho-
tographic originality and help to make sense of the roles that the 
camera’s mechanics and the image’s veracity play in the law’s 
treatment of photography. 24 
To depict an object is to represent the object visually, to give 
meaning to the object through a picture.25 In this Article, I rely 
upon the “seeing-in” approach to depiction introduced by philo-
sopher Richard Wollheim,26 the approach that dominates the work 
                                                                                                                            
& ENT. L.J. 55, 103–14 (1998); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection 
and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1594–1600 (1963); Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 
898–904 (2004); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 818–19 (2010); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2009). 
19 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 381 (“[I]t seems that the claim that many—
perhaps most—of the world’s photographs are completely unprotected by copyright 
arises simply because ‘[i]n most uses of the camera, the photograph’s naive or descriptive 
function is paramount.’”) (quoting SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 132–33 (1977)); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
683, 714–16 (2012). 
20 Hughes, supra note 15, at 343. 
21 Id. at 349. 
22 Id. at 344. 
23 See id. at 398; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
24 The concept of depiction is absent from the Copyright Act of 1976. The word 
depiction appears twice in Section 106A(c)(3) of the Visual Artist’s Rights Act of 1991, 17 
U.S.C. § 106A et seq., in a context unrelated to originality. 
25 See, e.g., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEPICTION 1 (Catharine Abell & Katerina 
Bantinaki eds., 2010) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES]; see discussion infra 
Part II.A. 
26 See, e.g., RICHARD WOLLHEIM, Seeing-As, Seeing-In, and Pictorial Representation, in 
ART AND ITS OBJECTS 205, 213–14 (2d ed. 1980) (introducing the “twofold thesis”). 
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of contemporary art scholars. Wollheim argues that what is unique 
to pictures as representations is that they cause a viewer to have a 
“twofold” visual experience: the viewer perceives design markings 
on the surface of the picture (the “first fold”) and, at the same 
time, perceives a real world object or scene in those design mark-
ings (the “second fold”).27 
The arguments presented herein flow from a simple observa-
tion: a photograph of a real world object or scene is a depiction and, 
as such, has two folds. The first fold consists of the design mark-
ings on the surface of the photographic paper. The second fold 
consists of the object or scene that a viewer perceives in those de-
sign markings. 
Introducing the concept of depiction into copyright law can of-
fer important insights into photographic originality. In Feist Publi-
cations, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,28 the Supreme Court set 
forth two criteria for originality: “[T]he work [must have been] in-
dependently created by the author (as opposed to copied from oth-
er works), and . . . it [must] possess[] at least some minimal degree 
of creativity.”29 
The fundamental thesis of this Article is that in the realm of the 
graphic arts—painting, etching, photography, etc.—the requisite 
minimal degree of creativity is based primarily on an artist’s choic-
                                                                                                                            
27 Katerina Bantinaki, Picture Perception as Twofold Experience, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at 128 (“The notion of twofoldness has been one of Richard 
Wollheim’s important contributions to the study of depiction. By means of this notion 
Wollheim aimed to highlight the fact that in seeing a picture the viewer can be visually 
aware of both the object that is being depicted and the medium in a single perceptual 
act.”) 
28 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
29 Id. at 345. I will refer to Feist’s requirements as the “non-copying” criterion and the 
“minimal creativity” criterion. What I refer to as the “non-copying” criterion has been 
referred to by others as the “independent creation” criterion. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, 
The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 81, 99–100 (1998). Some commentators collapse the two requirements. See, e.g., 
Hughes, supra note 15, at 340 n.3 (“Strictly speaking, under current U.S. doctrine, 
‘[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement’ for copyright protection and ‘originality 
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.’ . . . I use the two 
interchangeably. Assuming that ‘independent creation’ will not occur without 
‘creativity,’ establishing creativity establishes originality.” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 
346)). Contra Hughes, I argue that it is critical to consider these two requirements to be 
independent of one another. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
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es and actions that result in design markings being placed on the 
surface of the work, the first fold of depiction. Thus, a painting’s 
originality inheres primarily in the painter’s choices that result in 
brushstrokes being arrayed on the canvas’ surface. Similarly, a pho-
tograph’s originality inheres primarily in the photographer’s choic-
es that result in design markings being arrayed on the surface of the 
photographic paper (or pixels on a computer screen).30 
What is the relevance of the second fold of depiction—the ob-
ject that a viewer perceives in a picture—to photographic originali-
ty? Assuming that her choices in placing surface design markings do 
satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity criterion,31 the photographer’s 
choice of an object or scene to photograph can, on occasion, either 
enhance or defeat originality. 
In instances in which a photographer also poses or stages the 
subject matter that is to appear in the picture, such acts enhance 
the level of creativity she infuses into the picture. Thus, prearrang-
ing a still life or posing a person for a photograph can enhance mi-
nimal creativity for purposes of Feist.32 
Nonetheless, irrespective of how creative the choices related to 
placing surface design markings, if a photographer copies another 
work, the picture will run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion. 
Thus, it is doubtful that postmodern artist Sherrie Levine’s re-
nowned and extremely valuable photographs that merely re-
photographed images of depression-era photographer Walker 
Evans are original under Feist.33 
Understanding photographic originality in this way helps to cla-
rify the relationship between the enigmatic features of photography 
and copyright law. Given the primacy of choices concerning the 
placement of surface design markings, the major challenge to pho-
                                                                                                                            
30 These decisions include, among others, choosing a particular camera and film, 
adjusting the camera’s settings, adjusting artificial lighting and shadows, and choosing an 
angle from which to shoot the picture. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
31 Unless minimal creativity is established with respect to the first fold of depiction, no 
visual image (photographic or otherwise) can be original. Thus, photographs taken 
randomly by a drone flying over the Alps, despite their beauty, would in all likelihood not 
satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity criterion because there is no “personality” infused into 
the image. 
32 See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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tographic originality is the camera’s automatism. Do the mechanics 
of that device so constrict the range of a photographer’s choices 
with respect to marking the image’s surface that most photographs 
are inherently unoriginal?34 Recent scholarship by philosophers of 
photography suggests that attacks on the art status of the photo-
graph based on automatism are somewhat confused and significant-
ly overstated.35 
In great contrast, I will argue that the recent assault by legal 
scholars on photographic originality based on verisimilitude—the 
photograph’s being a “fact” in the world—is fundamentally mis-
conceived. A photograph of an object or scene is no more a fact in 
the world than is a painting of that same object or scene. This mis-
conception results from the failure to understand where to locate 
photographic originality. 
Attacks based on the photograph’s truthfulness assume that 
the object or scene that a viewer perceives in the image—
depiction’s second fold—plays a major role in determining the im-
age’s originality. But this is rarely the case. If a photograph is origi-
nal, it is because the photographer’s choices in placing surface de-
sign markings meet Feist’s minimal creativity standard. A photo-
graph of the Grand Canyon is no more a fact in the world than a 
realistic painting of the Grand Canyon is a fact in the world. Rather, 
both are pictures composed of surface design markings that depict 
objects and scenes in the real world. 
Part I explores the conflicting social and legal reactions to pho-
tography from the moment of its appearance in the late 1830s. I 
first examine the cultural debate that revolved around the enigmat-
ic features of the technology—the camera’s automatism and the 
photograph’s verisimilitude.36 I then explore how this debate en-
tered the courthouse when the Supreme Court first considered 
                                                                                                                            
34 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
35 See, e.g., Diarmuid Costello & Margaret Iversen, Introduction: Photography Between 
Art History and Philosophy, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 679, 685 (2012) (“By now, nearly all 
philosophers have rejected the claim that their underlying assumptions about 
photography preclude the possibility of fully fledged photographic art. Nonetheless, 
dominant conceptions of photography as an automatic recording mechanism within 
philosophy arguably still face difficulties doing full justice to artistic uses of the 
medium.”). See generally infra note 206. 
36 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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photographic originality in Burrow-Giles, and the aftermath of that 
decision on later courts’ treatment of photography.37 Part I con-
cludes by introducing the ongoing skepticism that contemporary 
scholars harbor toward photographic originality, a skepticism based 
on the enigmatic features of photography.38 
Part II turns to art theory, introduces the philosophical concept 
of depiction, and explores Wollheim’s proposal that every represen-
tational picture has two folds.39 I then apply the insights drawn 
from art theory to understanding photographic originality.40 
Part III explores in greater depth the challenge of contemporary 
legal scholars to photographic originality based on the camera’s 
automatism41 and the image’s verisimilitude.42 I conclude that pho-
tography survives both challenges and, accordingly, courts are cor-
rect in their assumption that “[a]lmost any photograph ‘may claim 
the necessary originality to support a copyright.’” 43 
I. THE CULTURAL AND LEGAL ATTACKS ON 
PHOTOGRAPHY’S ENIGMATIC FEATURES 
From the moment of its appearance in the 1830s, two features 
of photography have been at the vortex of both cultural and legal 
debates over whether or not the technology is an art form or mere 
information: 
1. The Camera’s Automatism—The photograph is the product 
of a mechanical device, the camera. In contrast to a painter whose 
every brushstroke is mediated through a mental vision, a photo-
grapher seems a mere technician relegated to clicking a shutter but-
ton. Her creative intentions seem to play virtually no role in the 
appearance of the image.44 
                                                                                                                            
37 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
38 See discussion infra Part I.C. 
39 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
40 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
41 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
42 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
43 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co, 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal 
citations omitted). 
44 See Diarmuid Costello & Dominic McIver Lopes, Introduction, 70 J. OF AESTHETICS 
& ART CRITICISM 1 (2012). (“At the core of the classic arguments in the philosophy of 
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2. The Photograph’s Verisimilitude—In the words of nine-
teenth century photographer Henry Peach Robinson, every photo-
graph appears to display “the absolute reproduction of some scene 
or person that has appeared before the camera.”45 
Throughout its history, these two features of photography have 
confounded critics, providing grounds for both high praise and bit-
ter condemnation.46 The fact that the same features of the technol-
ogy have fueled such conflicting reactions is the basis for what I 
term “the enigma of photography.” This contest of understand-
ings moved into the courtroom in the late nineteenth century. 
A. The Enigma of Photography and Cultural History 
During the first decade after photography’s disclosure in 
1839,47 the public responded to the new technology with utter 
wonderment, many considering the photograph to be miraculous 
and magical.48 Seen as having great potential for both science and 
                                                                                                                            
photography is the belief, expressed in a variety of ways, that photography is special 
because it is at bottom an automatic recording mechanism that ensures that what one sees 
in a photograph is causally determined by the photographed scene, rather than 
intentionally determined by the photographer.”). 
45 HENRY PEACH ROBINSON, PICTURE-MAKING BY PHOTOGRAPHY 114 (1884). 
46 The camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude are often seen as 
working in tandem. See, e.g., Diarmuid Costello & Dawn M. Phillips, Automatism, 
Causality and Realism: Foundational Problems in the Philosophy of Photography, 4 PHIL. 
COMPASS 1, 2 (2009) (“The realism of photographs, in some sense, depends on the 
automatism of the photographic process.”). A third feature of photography, its infinite 
reproducibility, has also been the subject of both praise and scorn. See, e.g., WALTER 
BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second Version, in 
THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF ITS TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS ON MEDIA 19, 20–22 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott et al. 
trans., 2008). The earliest photographs, however, were not reproducible and the 
technology to reproduce photographs did not come about until the 1850s. See MARIEN, 
CRITICS, supra note 5, at 42 (“The discourse in photography’s early years was so focused 
on the medium’s originality that it tended to exclude discussion of photography’s 
capacity to produce multiple copies.”). 
47 Because many people claim to have invented photography, Mary Warner Marien 
refers to the year 1839 as the year of photography’s disclosure, not discovery. See MARIEN, 
PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 1; see also MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 2 
(“[P]hotography’s origins had not one story but many conflicting stories. . . . Today, 
these contradictions continue to pack its history or, one should say, its histories.”). 
48 See MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 1–2 (“Those who witnessed the advent of 
photography in 1839 discussed its debut in the language of exceptions. Long before it 
could effect significant social change, photography was confidently described as a 
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art,49 photography was referred to an “art-science,”50 a label that 
survived into the 1850s. “The term recognized that photographic 
images were not only generated by a mix of science and art, but also 
applied in both activities,”51 Mary Warner Marien explains, 
“[e]specially in the early years … photography was flexible and ex-
perimental, neither a sharply delimited art form nor only the prov-
ince of science and technology.”52 
Much of the early excitement over photography hovered 
around the two distinctive features of the new technology, the 
camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude. 
The automatic nature of the camera captured the public’s im-
agination, in part because of a mythos promoted by the technolo-
                                                                                                                            
transformational technology.”). Edgar Allen Poe described the new technology as 
“miraculous beauty.” Edgar Allen Poe, The Daguerreotype, ALEXANDER’S WEEKLY 
MESSENGER (Jan. 15, 1840), cited in MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 12 (“Even 
commentators who knew exactly how photography worked wrote about it as a wonder.”) 
49 In his 1839 essay, William Henry Fox Talbot “conceived the photographic image as 
a kind of ‘natural magic’ with potential for science and art.” MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, 
supra note 2, at 28 (quoting William Henry Fox Talbot, Some Account of the Art of 
Photogenic Drawing, or the Process by which Natural Objects May Be Made to Delineate 
Themselves without the Aid of the Artist’s Pencil (1839)). 
50 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 23–24; see also id. at 71 (“In the first years 
after photography’s presentation to the world … the medium was not sharply defined as 
either art or science, but frequently termed an art-science.”); id. at 24 (“The ambiguous 
character of photography in its early years was fostered by the equally uncertain 
definitions of art and science. Art could mean a skill or a craft, as well as specific media 
such as painting, sculpture, and engraving. Science referred to areas of knowledge such as 
biology and geology, and also to techniques for making experiences and observations, 
such as objective scrutiny and recording.”). In fact, many early photographers viewed 
themselves as artists. Id. at 85 (stating that French photographer Nadar “maintained that 
he was not a simple operator of photographic equipment but an artist, sensitive to the 
nuances of personal character as well as rules of composition”). 
51 Id. at 23–24. 
52 Id. at 23. Mary Warner Marien’s cultural histories of photography cast doubt on the 
assertions of legal scholars that, early in its history, photography was not considered to be 
an art form. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 351 (“The very characteristics that made 
the photograph seem like ‘truth itself’ initially made photography seem to be only a 
technology and outside the realm of artistic works, both to artists and to mid-nineteenth 
century minds conversant with copyright.”); see also Farley, supra note 15, at 397 
(“Initially, photographers made no claims to be artists. Photographers stressed the 
mechanical nature of the process. The opportunities and possibilities that the camera 
presented for artistic creation were absent from the discourse. Even artists who took up 
photography had trouble articulating the value of creative, as opposed to documentary, 
photography.”) 
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gy’s pioneers, Louis Daguerre, William Henry Fox Talbot, and Jo-
seph Nicephonre Niépce.53 Despite the fact that early photographs 
required “lengthy preparation of materials prior to exposure . . . 
and a cumbersome development process,”54 these individuals 
“shied away from explaining photography as an invention that 
makes images through human agency. Each insisted that photogra-
phy originated in nature and was disclosed by nature.”55 Talbot 
explained that the image was “impressed by Nature’s hand.”56 
Niépce described his image as “spontaneous reproduction, by the 
action of light.”57 Stressing its apparent spontaneity, the pioneers 
referred to the new technology as “‘auto-graphy,’ . . . nature’s au-
tomatic writing.”58 
Coupled with the public’s amazement over the technology’s 
automatism was excitement over the photograph’s verisimili-
tude—its inherent truthfulness. Viewing the photograph as na-
ture’s product easily transmuted into viewing it as neutral vision—
an externalized, ideal human vision59 that offered transparent 
knowledge,60 an objective view of the world.61 The photograph was 
a “replica of original experience”62 and an “infallible representa-
                                                                                                                            
53 See MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 72. 
54 Id. at 40. 
55 Id. at 72. 
56 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 3 (citing W.H.F. TALBOT, supra note 4); see also 
MORSE, supra note 4, at 144 (“Nature . . . has taken the pencil into her own hands . . . .”). 
57 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 72–73 (quoting MARIEN, CRITICS, supra 
note 5, at 3 (internal citations omitted)). 
58 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 73. 
59 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
60 Id. at 7. 
61 In 1840, Edgar Allen Poe noted that “all language must fall short of conveying any 
just idea of the truth . . . but the closest scrutiny of the photogenic drawing discloses only 
a more absolute truth, a more perfect identity of aspect with the thing represented.” He 
further noted that photography was a “positively perfect mirror” that “is infinitely more 
accurate in its representation than any painting by human hands.” MARIEN, 
PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 26 (quoting Edgar Allen Poe, The Daguerreotype, 
ALEXANDER’S WEEKLY MESSENGER (Jan. 15, 1840), available at http://www.eapoe.org
/works/misc/dgtypea.htm). 
62 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 40. 
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tion”63 that surpassed any previous form of handmade iconogra-
phy.64 
The cultural excitement that marked photography’s first dec-
ade soon gave way to a more critical view: “[W]ith the continued 
spread of photography, the development of new applications, and 
the intense commercialization of the medium in the late 1850s, 
amazement at its ability to capture appearances declined. As pho-
tography became more commonplace, the medium’s societal and 
artistic impact was more frequently debated.”65 
The early wonderment over photography transformed after 
mid-century into concern over its debasing effects on mass culture: 
“By 1850 photography was immersed in societal debates and deep-
ly at odds with itself. It was conjectured to be variously an art, a 
danger to art, a science, a revolutionary means of education, a 
mindless machine for rendering, and a threat to social order.”66 
This debate was often shrouded in a narrower debate over whether 
photography should or should not be considered an art form.67 
                                                                                                                            
63 Id. 
64 The photograph’s surface appearance contributed to the perception that the image 
captured perfect truth: 
Unlike painting and engraving, photography left relatively few visible 
traces of its manufacture. Compared with brushstrokes and a network 
of lines, the daguerreotype seemed like a smooth mirror that did not 
betray how it was made. As a result, the photograph was seen as an 
automatic recording device that required no interpretation. 
Increasingly the photograph was believed to be what the average 
person would have seen standing in the same spot at the same time as 
the photographer.… The fact that photographers … manipulated and 
retouched negatives did not significantly affect the public’s belief in 
photographic truth. 
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 69. 
65 Id. at 75; see also id. at 139 (“[The] proliferation of photographs proved to be a mixed 
blessing; seeing many images eventually reduced the impact of each of them.…”). 
66 Id. at xiii. 
67 See, e.g., id. at 95 (“As photography lost its novelty, it gained both adherents and 
detractors, and they often focused on the relationship of photography to art and culture. 
On the one hand, the medium was the most exact way of creating art reproductions that 
could be viewed by more people than could travel to see the originals. . . . On the other 
hand, critics were quick to point out that the passion for optical exactitude suppressed the 
public’s appreciation for nuance and opportunities for quiet rumination on images. The 
transcription of visual appearances, however adeptly rendered, did not seem capable of 
conveying higher sentiments and moral example.”) 
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No surprise, attacks on photography focused on the technolo-
gy’s verisimilitude and automatism. Mary Warner Marien observes 
that “photographic verisimilitude became a bludgeon in the hands 
of photograph’s critics.”68 In deriding the objectivity of the image, 
in 1859 art critic Francis Frith described photography as “too 
truthful. It insists upon giving us ‘the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth.’ Now, we want, in Art, the first and the last 
of these conditions, but we can dispense very well with the middle 
term.”69 Critics feared that the photograph’s “intractable verisimi-
litude”70 could not express the personality and soul of the artist 
and would deaden the imagination.71 Art critic John Ruskin is said 
to have expressed concern that the growing use of photographs 
“implied the substitution of vulgar verisimilitude for higher 
truths.”72 
Concern over the photograph’s truthfulness was intermixed 
with concern over the camera’s automatism. Some believed that 
“[p]hotography’s apparent automatism simultaneously cheapened 
the photographer’s relationship to nature and to the traditions of 
fine art.… The ease of photography took away its character-
building challenge.”73 Others believed the new technology’s “au-
tomatism threatened to make the public weary of the work required 
in art making and to instigate a chic indifference to painstakingly 
acquired human skill.”74 In the view of critics, the camera was yet 
another machine that “tamped down human imagination, replacing 
creativity, observations and insight with mediocre readymade 
goods.”75 
Stung by these attacks, professional photographers sought to 
create a divide between the burgeoning availability of low-priced 
                                                                                                                            
68 Id. at 73. 
69 Frith, supra note 11, at 72, quoted in MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 77. 
70 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 73. 
71 See, e.g., NAOMI ROSENBLUM, A WORLD HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 210 (4th ed. 
2007) (internal citations omitted) (arguing that critics derided photography, declaring 
that the new medium “‘copies everything and explains nothing, it is blind to the realm of 
the spirit’”). 
72 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 107. 
73 Id. at 94. 
74 Id. at 59. 
75 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 159. 
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photographs and the realm of “High Art” photography, deemed to 
have the potential to elevate public morality.76 Other photograph-
ers, known as Pictorialists, counteracted the attack on photograph-
ic objectivity by encouraging photographers to render their subjects 
slightly out of focus.77 
At the same time, supporters of the new technology saw great 
potential in the truthfulness of the photograph to further the 
progress of science. “Photographic realism, so extensively em-
ployed as an indicator of cultural decline during photography’s ear-
ly decades, was redrafted in the 1880s in scientific, not artistic, 
terms.”78 Moreover, many considered photography’s power to 
create exact art reproductions to be an educational tool that could 
introduce fine arts to the masses.79 
Unfortunately, as the nineteenth century progressed, the early 
view that photography could be both an art and a science dimi-
nished.80 Rather, the late-century contest over the status of photo-
graphy as art form or mere information took on a broader signific-
ance: 
For better or worse, [photography] was associated 
with the technological changes sustained by an ur-
ban middle-class society. As a new kind of verisimi-
litude, not quite a copy, not quite an actuality, pho-
tography defined modern vicarious experience. It 
teetered between authenticity and artificiality, 
knowledge and deceit. As both an idea and an imag-
ing system, photography enhanced the tension be-
tween art conceived as the secular agency of truth 
                                                                                                                            
76 Id. at 75. 
77 Id. at 170; see infra note 270 and accompanying text. 
78 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 142. 
79 See id. at 68, 114; see also id. at 124 (“The photographic reproduction of art treasures 
promised to transmit aristocratic high culture to the lesser classes.”). 
80 See, e.g., MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 159 (“As photography emerged as 
scientific and social evidence, it was also increasingly labeled counterfeit in art. The link 
between art and science in the popular phrase “the art-science of photography” 
weakened. In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the early years of the 
twentieth century, art and science would be painstakingly disconnected.”). 
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and art conceived as the mirror of transient effects 
in nature and in society.81 
This contest of meanings would enter the courtroom in the 
1880s when the Supreme Court first considered the issue of photo-
graphic originality in Burrow-Giles. 
B. The Enigma of Photography in the Courts 
1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 
When Burrow-Giles came before the Supreme Court in 1884,82 
the cultural debate over the photograph’s status as an artwork or 
mere information had been waging for several decades. The liti-
gants brought this debate into the courthouse and, in so doing, 
challenged the Court to grapple with the camera’s automatism and 
the photograph’s verisimilitude. 
In that case, Napoleon Sarony, a well-known New York City 
portrait photographer, alleged that Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. 
infringed on his copyright in a photograph of Oscar Wilde by mak-
ing 85,000 unauthorized reproductions of the picture.83 Underlying 
these allegations lay the momentous question of whether the Con-
stitution permitted Congress to extend copyright protection to 
photographs in its Act of 1865.84 The answer turned on whether, 
under the Copyright Clause,85 a photographer could be considered 
an “Author” and a photograph a “Writing.”86 
                                                                                                                            
81 MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 111. 
82 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
83 Id. at 54. 
84 See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 38th Cong., 
2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198 (“[The Act’s provisions] shall extend to and include photographs 
and the negatives thereof … and shall ensure to the benefit of authors … in the same 
manner, and to the same extent, and upon the same conditions as to the authors of prints 
and engravings.”); CONG. GLOBE 981 (Feb. 22, 1865). 
85 Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, §8, cl. 8. To implement that provision, Congress enacted the first Copyright Act in 
1790, followed by major revisions in 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 
1175, and in 1976, Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
86 The lower court avoided both issues entirely by relying on the presumption of 
constitutionality afforded to acts of Congress. See Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
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In determining that a photograph could be deemed a Writing, 
the Court rejected Burrow-Giles’s contention that the Constitution 
limited that term to books.87 Noting that Congress had extended 
copyright protection to “maps, charts, designs, engravings, etch-
ings, cuts and other prints,”88 the Court concluded, 
it is difficult to see why congress cannot make [pho-
tographs] the subject of copyright as well as the oth-
ers. . . . The only reason why photographs were not 
included in the extended list in the act of 1802 is, 
probably, that they did not exist, as photography, as 
an art, was then unknown . . . .89 
In determining whether a photographer could be considered an 
Author, the court reached two conclusions. First, it established a 
broad originality requirement for copyright law, defining an “au-
thor” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; mak-
er.”90 Turning to photography, the Court also concluded: “We 
entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an 
act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are repre-
sentatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”91 
Accordingly, it was incumbent on the Court to explain exactly 
how photographs are the “original intellectual conceptions”92 of a 
photographer. Its solution to photographic originality was to 
ground authorship in the photographer’s pre-shutter acts related to 
                                                                                                                            
Co., 17 F. 591, 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883). On appeal, the Supreme Court also considered 
whether Sarony had placed adequate notice of copyright on his photograph, an issue the 
court dispensed with in a brief paragraph: 
[I]t is enough to say that the object of the statute is to give notice of 
the copyright to the publish by placing upon each copy, in some 
visible shape the name the author, the existence of the claim of 
exclusive right, and the date at which this right was objected. This 
notice is sufficiently given by the words ‘Copyright, 1882, by N. 
Sarony’ found on each copy of the photograph.” 
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55. 
87 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 57–58. 
90 Id. at 58. Modern courts look to this determination in Burrow-Giles as “the 
touchstone of copyright protection today.” See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
91 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58. 
92 Id. 
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posing or staging the tableau to be photographed.93 At the same 
time, the court suggested that less artful images—“the ordinary 
production of a photograph”94—that were “the mere mechanical 
reproduction of the physical features or outlines or some object”95 
might not be protected by copyright law. On that issue, the court 
stated, “[W]e decide nothing.”96 Nonetheless, that non-decision 
established a distinction between two types of photographs—an 
“original work of art,”97 on the one hand, and those deemed “or-
dinary,” on the other. 
But there’s a white elephant in the midst of the Supreme 
Court’s Burrow-Giles decision. The paragraph that sets forth the 
Supreme Court’s solution to photographic originality98—described 
by one commentator as “remarkable”99—is taken virtually verba-
tim from Napoleon Sarony’s Complaint.100 Moreover, the likely 
                                                                                                                            
93 In concluding that Sarony had proven “the existence of those facts of originality, of 
intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the part of the author,” id. at 59–
60, the Court relied upon the lower court’s finding: 
[I]n regard to the photograph in question, that it is a “useful, new, 
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff 
made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental conception, 
to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front 
of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and 
other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so 
as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and 
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from such 
disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by 
plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.” These findings, we think, 
show this photograph to be an original work of art, the product of 
plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author, and 
of a class of inventions for which the constitution intended that 
congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use, publish, and 
sell, as it has done by section 4952 of the Revised Statutes. 
Id. at 60 (quoting Findings of the Circuit Court ¶ 3, in Transcript of Record at 14, Burrow-
Giles, 111 U.S. at 53 (No. 1071) [hereinafter Transcript]). 
94 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 60. 
98 See supra note 93. 
99 Farley, supra note 15, at 425. 
100 Two separate paragraphs in Sarony’s Complaint state: 
And this plaintiff further says that the said photograph, the title of 
which is “Oscar Wilde, No. 18,” and which is the subject of this suit, 
is a new, useful, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and 
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inspiration for the Court’s distinction between art photographs and 
ordinary photographs can be found in Sarony’s Brief.101 According-
ly, what is remarkable is that no scholar has yet to focus on the par-
ties’ briefs as a way to gain deep insight into the Supreme Court’s 
decision.102 I will venture the bold claim that Sarony’s Brief, here-
tofore virtually ignored by scholars, offers insights into photograph-
ic originality that are as important as the Supreme Court’s Burrow-
Giles decision itself. I turn to the parties’ briefs. 
Given the controversy over photography whirling outside of the 
courthouse, it is unsurprising that Burrow-Giles’s Brief invites the 
Supreme Court to become directly embroiled in the debate over 
the camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude. The 
genius of Sarony’s responsive brief was to suggest a way for the 
court to sidestep that debate, a suggestion the court embraced with 
open arms. 
Burrow-Giles’s Brief is structured around two constitutional 
questions: “Are Photographers ‘Authors?’”103 and “Are Photo-
                                                                                                                            
that the same is the original invention and design of this plaintiff, for 
the reason that it was made by this plaintiff entirely from his own 
mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said 
Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the 
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, 
arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and 
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired 
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or 
representation, made entirely by this plaintiff, producing the picture 
which is the subject of this suit; and that the terms “author,” 
“inventor,” “designer,” as used in this complaint and in the art of 
photography mean the person who so produces the photograph. 
See Complaint, in Transcript, supra note 93, at 4, 6–7. This paragraph from Sarony’s 
Complaint is quoted virtually verbatim in the findings of the trial court. See Findings of 
the Circuit Court ¶ 3, in Transcript, supra note 93, at 14. Sarony also adopts the language 
from his Complaint in his Brief filed in the Supreme Court. See Brief on the Part of the 
Defendant in Error at 11–12, Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 53 (No. 1071) [hereinafter Sarony’s 
Brief]. 
101 See Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 12–14. 
102 Two scholars have recognized that the Court’s critical language has its origin in 
Sarony’s filings. See Farley, supra note 15, at 411 n.92 (“Although the Court states that 
this quote is from the lower court’s findings of fact, this language is also in Sarony’s 
brief.”); Subotnik, supra note 15, at 1500, n.52 (“Professor Farley identifies Sarony’s 
brief as the source of the language. In fact, the origin of the language can be traced back 
further still, nearly word for word, to Sarony’s complaint in the lower court.”). 
103 Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 9. 
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graphs ‘Writings?’”104 To answer both questions, Burrow-Giles 
sets out its basic legal premise: “To obtain a copyright upon any 
article whatever, the party claiming this protection must be the au-
thor of the visible article on which the copyright is granted. That is to 
say, that he must be the person through whose intellectual labor the 
article we see is produced.105 
Burrow-Giles asks, “Does [the Photographer] apply his own in-
tellectual labor to the materials of his composition?”106 The answer 
is no: “[I]n photography no intellectual and original labor is re-
quired.”107 
To support this assertion, Burrow-Giles first attacks the tech-
nology’s automatism. In so doing, it borrows the very tropes that 
photography’s pioneers used to describe the new technology—
photographs are the products of nature and light, not of human 
hands.108 Burrow-Giles argues that the “camera[] act[s] by 
UNCHANGEABLE LAWS OF NATURE,”109 and the image results from 
the “chemical forces of light on prepared plates.”110 Accordingly, 
“the true author is the sun—not the photographer.”111 “The light 
and shade in any picture varies with every painter, his own mental 
originality determining the same; but in the case of a photographer 
the lights and shades are beyond his power; his camera will reflect 
only the effect of the sunlight on the scene.”112 
Burrow-Giles then attacks the photograph’s verisimilitude as 
undermining originality. A photograph is “but an absolute repro-
                                                                                                                            
104 Id. at 17. 
105 Id. at 12. Burrow-Giles looks to a painter as an example of a person who invests such 
labor into his product: “[T]he painter’s mind is actively engaged; the choice of the 
correct colors, the mixture of colors, the correct light and shade, the drawing of the 
outlines—all are acts of an intellectual kind, and it is his work which transforms the blank 
canvas into a thing of beauty.” Id. at 14. 
106 Id. at 10. 
107 Id. 
108 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
109 Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 16. 
110 Id. at 10; id. at 19 (The photograph “is solely the work of the chemical forces of light; 
no brain work is required, no originality, no creative power of the mind.”). 
111 Id. at 8; see also id. (“If it is true that, ‘AFTER ALL, IT WAS THE SUN WHICH DREW THE 
PICTURE,’ then the sun alone is the author of the [photograph].…”). 
112 Id. at 16. 
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duction of something already extant, without change of any kind.”113 
Elsewhere it asserts: “[T]he very object of photography is to 
represent truthfully an object already extant, without any deviation 
at all from the subject. . . .THE BETTER THE PHOTOGRAPH, THE 
TRUER IS THE LIKENESS; THE LESS IS THE ORIGINALITY OF THE 
DESIGN.”114 
In its attack on photographic originality, Burrow-Giles’s Brief 
often intermixes arguments based on automatism with arguments 
based on verisimilitude: “A photograph, surely, is the reproduction by 
natural means of something already existing.… A photograph … is 
always a reproduction true to nature—a variation from the original 
is impossible by the very laws of nature which govern its produc-
tion.”115 “[T]he camera, acting by UNCHANGEABLE LAWS OF 
NATURE, represents the scene AS IT IS; nothing is added, nothing 
omitted.”116 
In responding to Burrow-Giles’s Brief, Napoleon Sarony’s 
challenge was clear-cut. The protagonists in Burrow-Giles’s drama 
were Nature, the Sun, and the Camera, none of which qualify as an 
“Author.” Moreover, the product of these non-authors is a photo-
graph that, as a mechanical copy of reality, is not a creative “Writ-
ing.” 
In crafting his argument, Sarony’s goal was twofold. First, he 
had to reinstate the photographer at center stage as an Author who 
exercised “his own intellectual labor.”117 Second, he had to deflect 
attention away from the automatic, mechanical nature of the cam-
era and the imitative nature of the photograph. Burrow-Giles had 
attempted to draw a clear distinction between photography and 
other arts. Sarony needed to counter this by aligning photography 
with arts indisputably protected by copyright law. 
                                                                                                                            
113 Id. at 20. 
114 Id. at 18; see also id. at 21 (“The very essence of photography denies the possibility of 
fancy or imagination—truthful representation of existing objects is what it aims at. No 
genius and no laborious thought is required; nothing but mechanical skill.”). 
115 Id. at 21. 
116 Id. at 16; see also id. at 11 (“[T]he true object sought after is a truthful representation 
of the subject.”); id. at 5 (“That photographs and negatives are not original works of art, 
but reproductions of existing objects by application of physical laws, has been recognized 
by the Courts.”). 
117 Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 10. 
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Accordingly, Sarony’s Brief sets forth two critical premises. 
The first is that copyright law sets out to protect an artist’s mental 
conception, but this can only be accomplished indirectly by pro-
tecting the “materialization” of that conception: “It is evident that 
what the law really seeks to protect is the ideal invention or creation 
of the mind, but as it is not practicable to give protection to that di-
rectly, the protection is given indirectly to certain materializations, 
or conventional and intelligible expressions thereof . . . .”118 
The second premise—and the more important for Sarony—is 
that the particular form in which an artist “expresses, manifests, or 
discovers”119 that materialization of his mental creation is not im-
portant, assuming that it is within the statutory subject matter of 
copyright law:120 
[T]he conceptions, inventions and creations of the 
mind may be manifested, expressed, or discovered 
in many ways and according to various arts. Every 
art has its own peculiar methods and forms of such 
expressions, manifestation or discovery …. For the 
purpose of securing the right, the particular form of 
manifesting, expressing or discovering is not impor-
tant, if it is one of those which the Legislature has 
seen proper to provide for ….121 
The thrust of his strategy is clear. The artist and his mental 
creation—whether painter, etcher, engraver or photographer—are 
brought front and center. A photographer is no different from any 
other artist in having such a mental creation, and it is the primary 
goal of copyright law to protect that creation. 
It is “not important,” however, how that mental creation is 
“manifested,” whether in a painting, a sculpture, an engraving or a 
photograph. Sarony proposes a broad non-discrimination principle 
                                                                                                                            
118 Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 6–7; see also id. at 13 (“[O]f necessity the law can 
only attach protection to the material thing which discovers, fixes, makes permanent, or 
serves as a vehicle of communicating that ideal.”). 
119     Id. at 11. 
120 A photograph was within the statutory subject matter of copyright law by reason of 
Congress’ Act of 1865. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540; see also Act of Mar. 
3, 1865, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198. 
121 Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 9–10 (emphasis supplied). 
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with respect to how a particular art form “expresses, manifests, or 
discovers” the artist’s mental creation: 
The painter cannot claim that the sculptor is not an 
author, inventor or designer because he does not 
discover his invention by means of color; nor can 
the sculptor claim that the dramatist is not an au-
thor, inventor or designer because he does not dis-
cover his inventions in the form of sculpture; each 
one in his particular art expresses, manifests or dis-
covers his invention according to the rules, re-
quirements or limitations of his own art.122 
Sarony then addresses directly Burrow-Giles’s attack on pho-
tographic originality: “But it is claimed that [art of photography] is 
not the subject of copyright protection because it is ‘discovered’ in 
the form of a photograph.”123 In responding to this attack, Sarony 
sets forth his pivotal argument, the one that the Supreme Court 
ultimately adopts: 
It is conceded that no such picture or scene as is de-
picted in [the photograph of Oscar Wilde] existed 
until Sarony placed the same in order, “invented 
it,” that prior to making the negative, Sarony had 
had the conception of this invention in his mind, but 
he had not stopped there; he had designed and set in 
order the whole scene or picture which he desired to 
discover or express or manifest . . . 124 
The creative acts that matter most to photographic originality 
are the photographer’s designing and setting the “whole scene” to 
be photographed—in modern parlance, staging or posing the tab-
leau. For Sarony, these “various acts constitute an author, inventor 
and designer in the art of photography”125 because they, in effect, 
construct in the real world a visible incarnation of the photograph-
                                                                                                                            
122 Id. at 11. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 356 (“Sarony was the first great copyright-
meets-technology decision of United States copyright law and sets a tone of technological 
neutrality that is still with us.”). 
123 Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 12. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
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er’s “mental conception, invention, or creation.”126 The con-
structed tableau is an embodied reflection of the photographer’s 
mental creation. 
It is critical to note that a photographer’s acts in designing and 
setting the tableau are not the same acts that “express, manifest or 
discover” the photographer’s mental conception, acts that Sarony 
has already suggested are “not important.” Rather acts of design-
ing and setting precede the unimportant acts of “discovering.” A 
photographer’s mental conception—now embodied in the staged 
tableau—is “discovered” through the act of clicking the shutter 
button on the camera and developing the photograph,127 acts that 
Sarony equates to a painter’s using a paintbrush or a sculptor’s us-
ing a chisel128: 
[H]aving [“designed and set in order the whole 
scene”] [Sarony] might have selected various forms 
of making it permanent, “discovering” it; he might 
have given it a permanent form, as an oil paint-
ing . . . ; or as a drawing in chalk or charcoal . . . ; or 
if he were an engraver or etcher, he might have en-
graved or etched it; if a sculptor, he might have 
made a statue of it; in any of these forms, it is con-
ceded, his right to protection could not be ques-
tioned.129 
Sarony’s brilliant move is complete. First, he refocuses atten-
tion on the photographer as an Author with a mental conception. 
Second, by instilling special importance in staging the tableau to be 
photographed as the embodiment of the photographer’s mental 
                                                                                                                            
126 Id. at 7. 
127 For Sarony’s argument, it is particularly important that the act of clicking the shutter 
button not be invested with much importance for it appears that Sarony did not actually 
operate the camera. See Farley, supra note 15, at 434 (“Sarony was not a photographer in 
the modern or technical sense. He was not interested in the camera work. Instead, he 
regularly employed a cameraman, Benjamin Richardson, to work the camera.”). 
128 See, e.g., Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 13 (“[T]he picture or scene from which 
[the Oscar Wilde photo] was made, had no existence until invented, created, or set in 
order by Sarony. And [Burrow-Giles] admits that up to the point of fixing or making 
permanent the picture or scene which is the subject of this suit, putting it into permanent, 
salable form, the author or inventor took all the steps which the painter, engraver, or 
sculptor would have taken.”). 
129 Id. at 12. 
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conception, Sarony diverts attention away from both the camera’s 
automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude. The camera is 
merely the tool for manifesting the photographer’s mental concep-
tion, now embodied in the staged tableau. The photograph is but 
the object in which the staged tableau is manifested. In making this 
argument, Sarony equates photography to the other visual arts. 
Sarony carefully avoids dealing with instances in which a pho-
tographer doesn’t stage the tableau, but instead snaps a photograph 
of a pre-existing object or scene. Sarony finesses this issue by sav-
ing it for another day: 
Having admitted all this, [Burrow-Giles] still urge[s] 
that all a photographer does is to take his camera, 
get his focus, and produce his picture, just as the 
hunter aims his gun, pulls the trigger, and lodges a 
bullet in the mark. Of course it is possible that there 
may be such cases, and such photographs, and when 
one of them comes up for adjudications doubtless 
the Court will consider that view.130 
It is hard to imagine a more eloquent way to describe what in 
modern parlance would be referred to as “point-and-shoot” pho-
tography. It is these two sentences, I suggest, that inspired the Su-
preme Court to distinguish between art photographs and ordinary 
photographs, and to defer considering whether the latter are pro-
tected by copyright until a future case. 
Given the document’s major influence on the Supreme Court, I 
read Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony131 through the lens of 
Sarony’s Brief. Accordingly, the formula for photographic original-
ity emerging from that case was as follows: 
1. Copyright Law protects as original the mental vision 
of an Author, as manifested in a Writing. 
2. In the case of photography, that mental vision is di-
rectly mirrored and embodied in the real world 
                                                                                                                            
130 Id. at 12–13. Sarony vigorously argues that his photograph falls into the artful 
category: “But . . . [Burrow-Giles] ignore[s] or overlook[s] the fact that the picture or 
scene from which [the photograph of Oscar Wilde] was made, had no existence until 
invented, created, or set in order by Sarony.” Id. at 13. 
131 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
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through the photographer’s staging or posing the 
tableau to be photographed. Therefore, a photo-
graph’s originality is based on such staging or pos-
ing. 
3. The acts through which the photographer “mani-
fests” that mental vision in a Writing—using a 
camera to shoot a photograph of the staged tab-
leau—are “not important.” Those acts are neces-
sary only to meet the constitutional requirement 
that the photographer’s mental vision be fixed in a 
Writing. 
By elevating the photographer’s pre-shutter acts of staging the 
tableau to the position of central importance for photographic ori-
ginality, the Supreme Court effectively extricated copyright law 
from the broader cultural debate over the camera’s mechanics and 
the photograph’s veracity—in no small measure thanks to Napole-
on Sarony’s litigation strategy. 
2. Post Burrow-Giles Cases—The Expansion of Pre-
Shutter Acts Relevant To Photographic Originality 
Within a decade after Burrow-Giles, lower courts would lose 
sight of the Supreme Court’s narrow grounding of photographic 
originality in acts of staging the tableau, and apply that case to find 
un-staged, point-and-shoot photographs original. In so doing, they 
began to expand the range of a photographer’s pre-shutter actions 
deemed relevant to copyright originality, an expansion that has 
continued to the present day. 
The first cases after Burrow-Giles to raise issues of photograph-
ic originality were brought by Benjamin Falk, a professional portrait 
photographer who, like Sarony, posed his subjects in his studio. 
Accordingly, these cases fit easily within the principles set forth in 
Burrow-Giles.132 Though in at least one instance Falk invited a court 
                                                                                                                            
132 Falk brought a series of cases alleging that others had infringed on his copyright in 
photographs taken in his studio. See, e.g., Falk v. T.P. Howell & Co., 37 F. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 
1888); Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); Falk v. 
Donaldson, 57 F. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893); Falk v. Schumacher, 48 F. 222 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1891); Falk v. Curtis Pub. Co., 98 F. 989 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1900); Falk v. Heffron, 56 F. 299 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1893). 
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to consider camera-related acts,133 courts in these cases tended to 
follow the Supreme Court’s lead by focusing narrowly on Falk’s 
staging the tableau as the basis for photographic originality. Typical 
is Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co.134 In defending against infringe-
ment, Brett Lithographing Co. argued that “the plaintiff is not suf-
ficiently shown to have been the author of the photograph.”135 Re-
lying on Burrow-Giles, the court found originality based on Falk’s 
posing the scene: “[E]nough was done here by placing the persons 
in position, and using the position assumed by the child at the 
proper time to produce this photograph. . . . He is, and no one else 
can be, the author of this.”136 
By the mid-1890s, however, courts began to look to camera 
manipulations alone as the basis for photograph originality. The 
first such case was Bolles v. Outing Co., decided in 1897.137 The 
plaintiff snapped a photograph of a yacht—an un-staged, point-
and-shoot image. In responding to the defendant’s argument that 
“no original, intellectual conception was involved in the produc-
tion of the original photograph,”138 the Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated: 
Whether a photograph is a mere manual reproduc-
tion of subject-matter, or an original work of art, is a 
                                                                                                                            
133 In Falk v. Donaldson, Falk testified at trial that he not only posed the model, but also 
“did the mechanical work of attending to the camera, focusing, and exposing the image.” 
57 F. at 33. The court concluded: 
An examination of the photograph shows that it is the work of an 
artist.… [Falk] was an artist before he became a photographist. He 
had had a large experience in taking photographs, and on this 
occasion he appears to have availed himself thereof, and by the use of 
lights and shadows, and various devices, to have produced a most 
satisfactory result. 
Id. It is possible that the ambiguous reference to “various devices” could be interpreted 
as referring to camera-related actions. 
134 48 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891). 
135 Id. at 679. 
136 Id. The reference to the “proper time to produce this photograph” can be 
interpreted as basing originality, at least in part, on Falk’s choosing the right moment to 
depress the shutter button—a camera-related action. 
137 77 F. 966 (2d Cir. 1897), aff’d, 175 U.S. 262 (1899); see also Teresa M. Bruce, In the 
Language of Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequately Account for Photography, 115 
W. VA. L. REV. 93, 112 (2012) (marking Bolles as the first case). 
138 Bolles, 77 F. at 970. 
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question of fact; and there is certainly sufficient evi-
dence in the present record to justify, if not to com-
pel, the conclusion that the one in question embo-
dies an exceptional degree of artistic conception and 
expression. It required the photographer to select 
and utilize the best effects of light, cloud, water, and 
general surroundings, and combine them under fa-
vorable conditions for depicting vividly and accu-
rately the view of a yacht under sail.139 
The court clearly adopts Burrow-Giles’s distinction between art 
photography and ordinary photography. In doing so, however, it is 
not at all clear that the court understood the Supreme Court to 
have limited the former category to staged or posed photographs. 
For the first time, a court found a photographer’s point-and-shoot 
image to be original based on its “conception and expression” by 
relying entirely on camera-related acts: choice of perspective, cam-
era adjustments and timing in capturing “the best effects of light, 
cloud, water, and general surroundings.”140 
Expansion of copyright protection for photographs beyond 
posed images was reinforced by the Supreme Court in its 1903 de-
                                                                                                                            
139 Id. 
140 Id. Later courts relied on Bolles to extend copyright protection to point-and-shoot 
photographs based on camera-related manipulation. For example, in Edison v. Lubin, 122 
F. 240 (1903), Thomas Edison sued the defendant for infringing on photographs taken 
from a film Edison created of the christening and launching of a ship. As explained by the 
court, Edison created the film by combining a series of point-and-shoot photographs 
involving no staging. Id. at 240–41. In responding to the defendant’s challenge that 
Edison’s photographs were not original, the court looked to Bolles and relied entirely on 
the photographer’s manipulating the camera: 
We are further of opinion the photograph in question met the 
statutory requirement of being intended to be perfected and 
completed as a work of the fine art. It embodies artistic conception 
and expression. To obtain it requires a study of lights, shadows, 
general surroundings, and a vantage point adapted to securing the 
entire effect. In [Bolles] . . . depicting a yacht under full sail was held 
to constitute an original work of art . . . ; and in view of the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court [Bleistein v. Donaldson Company] in 
reference to the character, in that regard, of a circus poster, we have 
no question that the present photograph sufficiently fulfills the 
character of a work of the fine arts. 
Id. at 242–43. 
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cision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.141 In upholding the 
copyrightability of a poster advertising a circus, Justice Holmes lo-
wered the bar for originality, stating that an artwork “is the per-
sonal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always con-
tains something unique.”142 Thus, even a “very modest grade of 
art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone” and 
“[t]hat something he may copyright” unless barred by statute.143 
At the same time, the Court expressed a strong admonition against 
courts making judgments of aesthetic quality.144 
On the one hand, Bleistein seconded the approach in Burrow-
Giles by not basing copyrightability on a judgment of a photo-
graph’s aesthetic attributes. On the other hand, by lowering the bar 
for copyright protection, Bleistein undermined Burrow-Giles’s dis-
tinction between art photographs and ordinary photographs. Look-
ing to Bleistein, that distinction was most seriously challenged in 
Jewelers’ Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.,145 where 
Judge Learned Hand noted that Burrow-Giles “left open an intima-
tion that some photographs might not be protected. . . . I think that, 
even as to these, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. rules, be-
cause no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the 
personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely 
alike.”146 
Accordingly, by the early twentieth century, lower courts ex-
panded the scope of a photographer’s pre-shutter choices that 
could ground originality from staging the tableau to camera mani-
pulation and choice of perspective. In the well-known case of Paga-
no v. Charles Beseler Co.,147 the plaintiff took a point-and-shoot pho-
tograph of the New York Public Library, of which the defendant 
allegedly made an “exact reproduction.”148 Though involving no 
                                                                                                                            
141 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
142 Id. at 250. 
143 Id. 
144 See id. at 251–52 (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside 
of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”). 
145 274 F. 932 (1921). 
146 Id. at 934. 
147 234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). 
148 Id. at 964. 
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posing or staging, the plaintiff’s pleadings mimicked language from 
Burrow-Giles to describe the photograph: 
In paragraph V of the complaint plaintiff’s allege 
that the picture is—“from his own original concep-
tion, to which he gave visible form . . . by selecting 
the position and place from which to take said pic-
ture, and the moment when the light, shade, cloud, 
and sky effects upon said New York Public Library 
and its surroundings combined to make a new har-
monious and artistic picture.”149 
The court found the point-and-shoot photograph to be original 
based on camera-related choices including the timing of when to 
press the shutter button: 
The question is not, as defendant suggests, whether 
the photograph of a public building may properly be 
copyrighted. Any one may take a photograph of a 
public building and of the surrounding scene. It un-
doubtedly requires originality to determine just 
when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the 
proper setting for both animate and inanimate ob-
jects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade, 
position, etc. The photograph in question is admira-
ble. The photographer caught the men and women 
in not merely lifelike, but artistic, positions, and this 
is especially true of the traffic policeman. The back-
ground, taking in the building of the Engineers’ 
Club and the small trees on Forty-First street, is 
most pleasing, and the lights and shades are excee-
dingly well done.150 
Pagano provides clear evidence that the lower courts’ revision-
ist reading of Burrow-Giles had taken serious hold by the early 
                                                                                                                            
149 Id. at 963. 
150 Id. at 964. The court appears to ignore Bleistein’s admonition not to make judgments 
as to the aesthetic quality of the image when it describes the positions of the people as 
“artistic,” the background as “most pleasing,” and the lights and shades as “exceedingly 
well done.” Id. 
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twentieth century.151 Based on these early cases, contemporary 
courts now look well beyond staging the tableau to a broad range of 
photographer choices and actions to ground originality. Typical is 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Rogers v. Koons.152 
Though citing Burrow-Giles, the court states that “[e]lements of 
originality in a photograph may include posing the subjects, light-
ing, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired ex-
pression, and almost any other variant involved.”153 As a result of 
this expansion of the grounds for photographic originality, courts 
now accept that “[a]lmost any photograph ‘may claim the neces-
sary originality to support a copyright.’”154 
3. Scholarly Skepticism Over Photographic Originality 
In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court cleverly deflected atten-
tion away from concerns over the camera’s automatism and the 
photograph’s verisimilitude by grounding photographic originality 
in pre-shutter acts of the photographer. This approach continues to 
the present day, albeit embracing a broader range of pre-shutter 
acts on which to ground a photograph’s copyrightability. Accor-
dingly, one might assume that concerns over the camera’s mechan-
ics and the image’s truthfulness no longer plague copyright law. 
                                                                                                                            
151 See Hughes, supra note 15, at 363 (“Over time, courts—like critics and 
commentators—became comfortable moving beyond the idea of extra-machine 
composition to increasingly recognize personal expression in the process of using the 
machine.”). 
152 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
153 Id. at 307. 
154 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 2.08[E][1]). In Mannion, Judge Lewis Kaplan 
summarized contemporary copyright law by identifying three “not mutually exclusive” 
respects in which a photograph can be original—rendition, timing, and creation of the 
subject. 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452. Rendition includes technical aspects that do “‘not 
depend on creation of the scene or object to be photographed . . . and which resides 
[instead] in such specialties as angle of shot, light and shade, exposure, effects achieved 
by means of filters, developing techniques, etc.’” Id. (quoting 1 HON. SIR HUGH LADDIE, 
ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 4.57, at 229 (3d ed. 2000) 
(alteration in original)). Timing includes the photographer’s decision as to when to shoot 
the picture “‘by being at the right place at the right time.’” Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 
452–53 (quoting 1 LADDIE § 4.57, at 229). Creation of the subject is implicated in 
photographs in which the photographer poses the subject matter before snapping the 
picture, Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 453–54, the grounds upon which the Court in 
Burrow-Giles relied. 
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In fact, copyright scholars continue to express deep skepticism 
over photographic originality,155 and this skepticism is grounded in 
the enigmatic features of photography that fueled the nineteenth 
century debate—the camera’s automatism156 and the photograph’s 
verisimilitude.157 
Relying on the device’s automatism, Professor Kathleen Con-
nolly Butler has challenged the copyrightability of photographic 
reproductions of artwork based on the mechanics of the camera. 
Mirroring Burrow-Giles Lithography Co.’s attack on Napoleon Sa-
rony’s photograph, she states: 
In a photographic reproduction, the camera, not the 
photographer, mimics the art. The mechanical 
process involved, rather than decisions by the pho-
tographer about composition, contour, and texture, 
insures that the photograph will look like the paint-
ing. The photographer may decide how to position, 
light, and focus the artwork to ensure the quality of 
the likeness, but every photographer will obtain a 
likeness of some quality.158 
Other legal critics base their skepticism toward photographic 
originality on the photograph’s verisimilitude. These attacks look 
to the fundamental tenet that copyright law protects only creative 
expression, not facts or ideas.159 The staunchest such critic is Pro-
fessor Justin Hughes. For Hughes, the “information-laden nature 
of photographs”160 leads to the conclusion that for purposes of 
copyright law, most photographs should be deemed unprotected 
facts, not creative expression. In his view, “a large percentage of 
                                                                                                                            
155 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 345–51 (expressing concern over the factual 
nature of most photographs); Butler, supra note 18, at 104–13 (expressing concern over 
the camera’s mechanical nature); Gorman, supra note 18, at 1594–1600 (expressing 
concern over the factual nature of photographs); see also Harrison, supra note 18, at 898–
904; Madison, supra note 18, at 818–19; Miller, supra note 18, at 456–57. 
156 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
157 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
158 Butler, supra note 18, at 113. 
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original 
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
160 Hughes, supra note 15, at 349. 
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the world’s photographs are likely not protected by American cop-
yright law because the images lack even a modicum of creativi-
ty.”161 
Before addressing these attacks by contemporary critics on the 
photograph’s originality based on the camera’s automatism and the 
image’s verisimilitude, I introduce the concept of depiction from art 
theory into copyright law. 
II. DEPICTION AND COPYRIGHT ORIGINALITY 
Introducing the concept of depiction into copyright law can shed 
considerable light on photographic originality. Equally important, 
the concept can help to unravel confusion that has plagued both 
cultural and legal critics in their attempts to make sense of the 
camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude. 
A. The Concept of Depiction 
What is depiction? The world is filled with objects that can be 
represented in different ways. Let’s consider one such object, a 
hippopotamus. The following representation is from a poem by 
T.S. Eliot: 
The broad-backed hippopotamus 
Rests on his belly in the mud; 
Although he seems so firm to us 
He is merely flesh and blood.162 
This is a verbal representation of a hippopotamus, employing 
words as the medium of expression; such a representation is re-
ferred to as a description. 
                                                                                                                            
161 Id. at 374. 
162 T.S. ELIOT, THE HIPPOPOTAMUS, POEMS, PLAYS AND PROSE 82–83 (1995). 
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Now consider another representation of a hippopotamus, this 
one by nineteenth century French photographer, Juan de Borbón:  
                    163 
This is a visual representation of the animal, one that employs a 
picture rather than words as the medium of expression: such a re-
presentation is referred to as a depiction. 
Notice that a description of a hippo and a depiction of a hippo 
have the following in common: both represent the animal by utiliz-
ing a collection of marks on a flat surface. The description uses 
words printed on a surface—language—to represent the hippo; the 
depiction uses marks arranged in a particular design to represent 
hippo. 
We have a general understanding of how language represents. 
Through linguistic conventions, words are arbitrarily assigned to 
objects in the world. There is no necessary connection between the 
word “hippopotamus” and the object that word represents. The 
words “ippopotamo” (for Italian speakers) and “Nilpferd” (for 
German speakers) equally represent a hippopotamus. 
Depiction is more puzzling. In order to represent a hippopota-
mus pictorially, we do not have the same freedom to mark the flat 
                                                                                                                            
163 Juan de Borbón, The Hippopotamus at the Zoological Gardens, Regent’s Park (1852), 
available at http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/
283086. 
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surface in any way convention might come to adopt. The surface 
must be marked in the correct way. But what is that correct way?164 
To understand depiction, one must examine the relationship 
among three things: a picture’s design markings—the marks, lines, 
shadings, boundaries, contours, shapes, colors, textures, etc., that 
are laid down on the picture’s surface in paint, ink, charcoal, pho-
tographic chemicals, or perhaps digital pixels on a computer 
screen; a picture’s content—the real world object or event that a 
viewer perceives in looking at the picture; and a picture’s subject, 
the real world object itself.165 One thing is clear: we do not see a 
hippopotamus in a picture in the same way that we see the real life 
animal in a zoo. When looking at the picture, we perceive the ani-
mal in the design markings on the surface. We never confuse those 
markings for a real hippopotamus. 
Though in the past, art theorists attempted to explain how a 
picture depicts a real world object by asserting that the picture re-
sembles the object, the resemblance approach to depiction has been 
largely abandoned.166 Instead, most contemporary philosophers 
accept some version of the “seeing-in” approach to depiction pro-
posed by philosopher Richard Wollheim in the 1980s.167 
For Wollheim, the seeing-in approach attempts to capture what 
distinguishes visual representation—depiction—from other types 
of representation.168 Unlike other types of representation such as 
verbal description, for Wollheim a picture has the unique ability to 
trigger what he refers to as the twofold experience of seeing-in.169 In 
looking at a picture, a viewer sees both a marked two-dimensional 
surface and, at the same time, sees an object or scene in that marked 
                                                                                                                            
164 See R.D. HOPKINS, DEPICTION, CONCISE ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 202–03 (2000) (establishing a conceptual framework). 
165 DOMINIC LOPES, UNDERSTANDING PICTURES 3–4 (1996). 
166 DOMINIC LOPES, SIGHT AND SENSIBILITY 26 (2005) (“Fatal difficulties have made 
resemblance theories historical curiosities.”). 
167 See, e.g., ANTHONY SAVILE & RICHARD WOLLHEIM, IMAGINATION AND PICTORIAL 
UNDERSTANDING, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY 
VOLUMES 19–60 (1986). 
168 See id. at 46; see also Bantinaki, supra note 27, at 128 (“By means of [the] notion [of 
twofoldness] Wollheim aimed to highlight the fact that in seeing a picture the viewer can 
be visually aware of both the object that is being depicted and the medium in a single 
perceptual act.”). 
169 See WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 214. 
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surface. It is by virtue of a picture’s ability to trigger such a twofold 
perceptual experience that makes it a depiction.170 Though Woll-
heim’s scholarship has triggered considerable discussion and criti-
cism,171 most modern scholars agree that linking depiction to a two-
fold perceptual experience is a major advance in understanding 
how pictures operate in our lives.172 
The insights offered by this Article flow from a simple observa-
tion: a photograph of a real world object is a depiction. Accordingly, 
such a photograph has two folds. The first fold consists of the de-
sign markings on the surface of the photographic paper (or pixels 
on a computer screen). The second fold consists of the picture’s 
content—the real world object or scene that a viewer perceives in 
the design markings. Consider de Borbón’s photograph of a hippo-
potamus.173 It depicts the animal. In looking at the photograph, a 
viewer is aware that she is looking at design markings on a picture’s 
surface (and not at the animal itself). At the same time, the viewer 
is aware that she is seeing a real world object in those surface design 
markings—a hippopotamus. 
B. The Two Folds of Depiction and Copyright Originality 
The fundamental thesis of this Article is that, for purposes of 
copyright law, what makes a picture original are first and foremost 
the artist’s choices and actions that result in the placement of de-
sign markings on the picture’s surface. The picture’s content—the 
object or scene that a viewer perceives in those markings—is, at 
                                                                                                                            
170 See WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 217–18; see also Robert Hopkins, Inflected Pictorial 
Experience: Its Treatment and Significance, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, 
at 152 (“If I go to the British Museum and look at [a Rembrandt drawing of a pastor], I see 
ink marks on a piece of yellowed paper. But I also (in some sense) see a man, holding his 
left hand outward, as if engaged in conversation. My experience of the picture thus has 
two dimensions to its content. It represents what is before me, a marked surface; and it 
represents something else, a man with certain features. When I see one thing as a picture 
of something else, my experience has this double content. This is how I know that a 
picture is before me, and how I know what the picture’s own content is, what it 
depicts.”). 
171 See Bantinaki, supra note 27, at 129 n.3 (discussing objections to Wollheim’s seeing-
in approach to depiction). 
172 See, e.g., id. at 128 (describing Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness as an “important 
contribution[] to the study of depiction”). 
173 See supra note 163. 
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most, secondary to a determination of originality. This thesis ap-
plies to any graphic work that depicts an object or scene—a paint-
ing, a lithograph, an etching, or a photograph. 174 
1. The First Fold of Depiction—Photographic Originality is 
Based Primarily on Choices and Actions Related to Placing 
Design Markings on a Picture’s Surface 
Consider an 1887 work by Van Gogh, Self-Portrait with a Straw 
Hat: 
                    175 
What makes this painting original? 
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,176 the 
Supreme Court set forth two criteria of originality: “[T]he work 
[must have been] independently created by the author (as opposed 
to copied from other works), and . . . it [must] possess[] at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.”177 As noted above, I refer to 
                                                                                                                            
174 Throughout this Article, I am considering figurative representational pictures, 
pictures that are intended to depict real world objects or scenes. The remarks herein do 
not apply, for example, to abstract paintings, though some philosophers suggest that one 
could view such paintings as representations. See, e.g., LOPES, UNDERSTANDING 
PICTURES, supra note 165, at 5–6 (explaining that abstract paintings might be considered 
to be representational). 
175 Vincent Van Gogh, Self-Portrait with a Straw Hat (1887), available at 
http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/436532. 
176 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
177 Id. at 345. 
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these as the “non-copying” and the “minimal creativity” crite-
ria.178 
There is little doubt that the painting satisfies the non-copying 
criterion. It originated from Van Gogh and did not copy another 
artist’s work. Commentators agree that determining whether a 
work of art satisfies the non-copying criterion is rarely difficult.179 
Though few would question that the painting satisfies Feist’s 
minimal creativity criterion, explaining how it does so is more chal-
lenging. Viewing the painting as a depiction aids in this endeavor. 
We first confront a stumbling block in copyright law. It may 
seem obvious that determining whether a picture is minimally crea-
tive must turn on assessing the aesthetic quality of how the design 
markings are arrayed on the picture’s surface—depiction’s first 
fold. In fact, in Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court did refer to the 
photograph of Oscar Wilde as a “useful, new, harmonious, charac-
teristic, and graceful picture.”180 In so doing, it appeared that the 
Court was in fact making a judgment of the image’s aesthetic quali-
ty. Nonetheless, the Court then went on to locate originality in pre-
shutter acts of the photographer.181 Most commentators agree that 
the Court’s passing reference to the aesthetics of Sarony’s image 
carries little precedential weight in determining photographic ori-
ginality.182 
Any doubts as to whether courts should make judgments of aes-
thetic quality in determining originality were laid to rest by Bleis-
                                                                                                                            
178 See supra note 29. 
179 See, e.g., Robert Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or 
Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2001–2002) (“The most common understanding 
of authorship—a word whose root is in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution—is that 
a work must ‘originate’ with the putative author, and that it not be slavishly copied from 
another. Whether a work is copied or is a product of independent origination usually 
invites a straightforward and objective factual determination, even though proof is 
typically circumstantial. Courts rarely have to make value judgments.”). 
180 Burrow-Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
181 Id. 
182 See, e.g., Farley, supra note 15, at 431 (“The Court could have focused on the 
photograph itself, evaluating originality as measured by aesthetics, but instead it focused 
on how the photographer created the subject of the photograph. That is, it does not 
evaluate the final product for signs of the author, but rather evaluates the practice as 
authorial.”). 
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tein’s strong admonition against doing so.183 Some courts and 
commentators continue to argue that, in the end, originality must 
adhere in aesthetic attributes of the picture itself, not in the artist’s 
actions in creating the picture.184 Nonetheless, following Bleistein, 
most courts now look solely to the photographer’s pre-shutter 
choices and actions to ground originality, not aesthetic attributes of 
the picture.185 After Feist the relevant inquiry for determining ori-
ginality is whether such choices and actions evidence a minimally 
creative input of the artist’s personality into the work rather than 
mere “sweat of the brow,” a mindless exertion of effort.186 
Accordingly, determining whether Van Gogh’s painting is orig-
inal becomes a question of whether the artist’s choices and actions 
related to marking the canvas’s surface evidence an input of Van 
Gogh’s creative personality. Such choices and actions include deci-
sions that were made well before the artist picked up a brush such 
as mixing paint (or some other medium) on a palette and choosing 
which tools to use. Perhaps most importantly, relevant to originali-
ty are the choices and actions the artist makes while brushing paint 
onto the canvas. Few would argue that Van Gogh’s choices and 
actions do not far exceed the minimally creative standard. 
                                                                                                                            
183 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.”). 
184 See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“[C]ourts have not always distinguished between decisions that a photographer makes in 
creating a photograph and the originality of the final product. . . . Decisions about film, 
camera, and lens, for example, often bear on whether an image is original. But the fact 
that a photographer made such choices does not alone make the image original. . . . 
Protection derives from the features of the work itself, not the effort that goes into it.”); 
see also Hughes, supra note 15, at 409 (“It is . . . acceptable to say that ‘the creative 
decisions involved in producing a photograph may render it sufficiently original to be 
copyrightable,’ but originality must be in the visible effects in the work itself, not in the 
means of achieving those effects.”). 
185 See Hughes, supra note 15 at 409 (“[A]s soon as a judge starts assessing originality in 
the visual image, it is easy to slip into the murky zone of artistic judgments that Bleistein 
warns judges to avoid. . . . But a jurist who takes to heart Holmes’s admonition to avoid 
judging ‘the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits’ will quickly become uncomfortable trying to describe the nuanced elements of a 
photograph. The simplest solution is to focus on creative choices and decisions.”). 
186 See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1991) 
(enumerating the flaws of “sweat of the brow” as a doctrine). 
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How do we determine whether de Borbón’s photograph of a 
hippopotamus is original? We do so in the exact same way that we 
determined whether Van Gogh’s painting is original. We look to 
the photographer’s choices and actions that resulted in design 
markings being arrayed on the photographic paper. These include 
de Borbón’s first coating that paper with salt and silver nitrate; 
choosing a camera and lens; adjusting the camera settings; choos-
ing a perspective from which to aim the camera at the animal; ad-
justing artificial lighting and screens to change the light and shadow 
on the animal; and finally choosing the exact moment at which to 
click the shutter button.187 If those choices and actions—all related 
to the first fold of depiction—evidence de Borbón’s infusing a mi-
nimally creative degree of his personality into the image, the pho-
tograph is original. 
Of course, in looking at a photograph, a viewer sees both sur-
face design markings and the content of the photograph at the same 
time.188 That’s Wollheim’s whole point189—a depiction is charac-
terized by its ability to cause that twofold experience in the viewer. 
In de Borbón’s photograph we see the image’s content—the hip-
po—knowing all the while that we are looking at a picture com-
posed of design markings on photographic paper. With effort, how-
ever, a viewer can consciously focus on one of the two folds of de-
                                                                                                                            
187 Throughout this Article, I do not consider post-shutter manipulation of the 
photograph in the darkroom or on a computer (“photoshopping”) to be relevant to 
originality. Both legal commentators and art theorists agree that such manipulations 
undermine the conventional bases on which we understand an image to be a 
“photograph.” See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 366 (“[In discussing originality], 
[c]ourts and law commentators almost never mention airbrushing, photomontage, or 
‘composition’ techniques involving multiple negatives, although such techniques have 
been in limited use since the mid-nineteenth century and the results of such techniques 
would support a finding of originality. Why? We can conjecture that the main reason is 
that these have not been seen as proper photography among photography professionals 
and cognoscenti. . . . [A]s long as most photographers accepted these conventional limits 
of the medium—that is, the exclusion of optical or chemical manipulations—then the 
disputes that would come before courts would be so limited.”). 
188 See, e.g., Dominic McIver Lopes, The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency, 112 
MIND 433, 440 (2003) (“In normal circumstances, seeing through a photograph happens 
simultaneously with seeing the photographic surface itself and is consistent with the belief 
that what is before one’s eyes is a photograph, not the photographed object. Photographic 
transparency is not photographic invisibility.”).  
189 See WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 213–14. 
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piction—what has been described as “separation seeing-in.”190 De-
termining whether a picture is original for copyright purposes 
mandates that a viewer engage in separation seeing-in and focus 
mainly on the design markings on the image’s surface and the art-
ist’s relationship to those markings. 
2. The Second Fold of Depiction—The Object or Scene 
Perceived By a Viewer in a Photograph is Only Secondarily 
Related to Copyright Originality 
What is the relevance of the picture’s subject—the real world 
object or scene that a photographer chooses to shoot and that a 
viewer perceives in the photograph—to the image’s originality? 
Generally, the object or scene a viewer perceives in a painting 
or a photograph has little impact on the image’s originality. Every 
representational painter chooses something to paint. Every photo-
grapher chooses something at which to point the camera. It is im-
possible to judge the creativity of either choice apart from the art-
ist’s success or failure in placing design markings on the surface of 
the canvas or photographic paper. A painting is original not be-
cause the painter creatively chose a particular object or scene to 
paint. Rather, its originality results from the painter’s choices and 
actions in translating his intellectual vision onto the surface of the 
canvas. Similarly, a photograph’s originality does not generally re-
late to the choice of an object or scene at which to point the cam-
era. Rather the resulting image will be original because of the pho-
tographer’s creative choices and actions related to marking the sur-
face of the photographic paper. Accordingly, the choice of an ob-
ject or scene to paint or photograph rarely has significance for cop-
yright protection.191 
                                                                                                                            
190 See John H. Brown, Seeing Things in Pictures, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 25, at 208, 210–14 (explaining separation seeing-in); see also Bantinaki, supra note 27, 
at 143 (“[In separation seeing-in] the material elements on the picture’s surface are seen 
as forming a meaningful whole ….”). 
191 See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:118 (2010) (“The nature of 
photographic authorship is not at all dependent upon or influenced by the uniqueness or 
even protectability of the objects photographed. An original photograph of a common 
flower (think of Georgia O’Keeffe) is entitled to protection no differently from an original 
photograph of an original sculpture. Photographic authorship lies not in the object 
captured by the photographer (although elements of layout or placement of that object or 
objects may form a basis of protection), but rather in the creative choices made by the 
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On occasion, however, the object or scene that a viewer 
perceives in a painting or photograph may impact copyright 
originality. 
In instances in which the artist stages or poses the scene that 
she ultimately paints or photographs, those actions enhance the 
completed work’s originality because they evidence an additional 
input of personality into the work. Thus, an artist’s arranging fruit 
on a table for a still life prior to painting or photographing that tab-
leau enhances the resulting image’s originality for copyright pur-
poses. Nonetheless, there is no requirement that a photographer 
stage the tableau in order for the resulting picture to be original. 
On rare occasion the choice of an object to paint or photograph 
can undermine the completed work’s originality. This occurs when 
the graphic image runs afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion.192 
Commentators generally agree that an artwork runs afoul of this 
                                                                                                                            
photographer about how to capture the object, as well as postphotographic choices made 
in developing and printing the work.”). 
192 It is important to distinguish copying for purposes of originality from copying for 
purposes of infringement under Section 106(1), the Reproduction Right. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(1) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords …”). Consider a photograph of a copyright protected sculpture. Assume 
first that the photograph is licensed. Irrespective of whether the photograph is properly 
characterized as a derivative work, see, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int., 586 F.3d 513, 
518 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Whether photographs of a copyrighted work are derivative works is 
the subject of deep disagreement among courts and commentators alike.”), it is now 
generally accepted that for such a photograph to be original, “the relevant standard is 
whether [it] contains a ‘nontrivial’ variation from the preexisting work.” See id. at 520 
(quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, §§ 3.01, 3.03[A]). If such a variation exists, 
the photograph does not run afoul of Feist’s non-copying requirement. 
 Now assume the same photograph to be unlicensed. Whether or not it copied the 
depicted sculpture for purposes of infringement analysis would be determined by the more 
protective “substantially similar” test. Pursuant to that standard, it might well be found 
to infringe despite a nontrivial variation from the preexisting work. See, e.g., Gentieu v. 
Tony Stone Images, 255 F. Supp. 2d 838, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Substantial similarity is 
determined by applying the ordinary observer test: ‘whether the accused work is so 
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the 
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible [sic] expression by taking 
material of substance and value.’”) (quoting Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright 
Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
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requirement only when it slavishly copies another work, copies it 
“outright in its entirety.”193 
In the realm of the graphic arts, what constitutes slavish copy-
ing?194 Let’s begin with painting. An artist who paints an exact, 
brushstroke-for-brushstroke copy of a Grand Master in a museum 
will, in all likelihood, run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion and 
her painting will not be deemed original. This example illustrates 
the importance of viewing Feist’s two criteria as independent of 
one another.195 It does not follow that because the painter has sla-
vishly copied the existing work, her actions lack minimal creativity. 
Creating an exact copy of another painting entails an extensive ar-
ray of creative choices and actions related to mixing paints and im-
itating brushstrokes, actions that far exceed the threshold of mi-
nimal creativity. For copyright purposes, the problem with the fi-
nished work is copying, not lack of minimal creativity. 
How can a photograph run afoul of Feist’s non-copying crite-
rion and thereby be unoriginal? There are three ways in which this 
can occur. 
1. A photograph of another photograph (such as those created 
by postmodern artist Sherrie Levine)196 will run afoul of the 
non-copying criterion because such an image slavishly ap-
propriates each and every creative action and decision made 
                                                                                                                            
193 See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 1504 (noting that Feist prohibits only a “work [that] 
has been copied outright in its entirety”); see also Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 
329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘Originality . . . means little more than a prohibition 
on actual copying’ . . . any more demanding requirement would be burdensome to enforce 
and would involve judges in making aesthetic judgments, which few judges are competent 
to make.” (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 489 (9th Cir. 
2000))). 
194 See Terry S. Kogan, Photographic Reproductions, Copyright and the Slavish Copy, 35 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 476–93 (2012) (exploring the meaning of “slavish copying”). 
195 See PATRY, supra note 191, § 3.31 (“There is thus no nexus between independent 
creation and the amount of creativity required for the work to be copyrightable.”). 
196 Diarmuid Costello and Margaret Iversen describe Sherrie Levine’s “interest in the 
photograph as a kind of pictorial readymade that can be appropriated and repurposed in 
ways that limit authorial control. . . . [Levine was interested] in photography as a resource 
for art precisely insofar as it might be thought to relieve [her] of certain burdens of artistic 
control.” Costello & Iversen, supra note 35, at 686–87. 
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by the first photographer that resulted in design markings 
being placed on the image’s surface. 197 
2. A photographer who restages in minute detail the tableau 
that another photographer created for a pre-existing a pho-
tograph will run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion. In 
such a case, the later photographer will have slavishly co-
pied the first photographer’s creative acts in staging the 
tableau to be photographed, the one instance in which the 
second fold of depiction impacts copyright originality.198 
3. There is a third way in which a new photograph might run 
afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion, one that relates to the 
first fold of depiction. Since photographic originality is 
based primarily on the photographer’s pre-shutter choices 
and actions, completeness requires that we consider the 
possibility of a photographer’s slavishly copying those 
choices and actions of another photographer. 
Imagine the following: a professional photographer, Photopro, 
hikes to the top of a cliff in a national park to photograph the sun-
set. He situates his tripod, points his camera, and adjusts the cam-
era settings. Assume he chooses a complex combination of settings 
to exaggerate the intensity of the sunset. He then presses the shut-
ter button at the moment of sunset. 
Assume further that another professional photographer, Hiker, 
followed Photopro to the top of the cliff. He carefully notes each 
and every camera and tripod setting utilized by Photopro. Moreo-
ver, he casually inquires of Photopro what type of film he is using. 
                                                                                                                            
197 In all likelihood, a photograph that slavishly re-photographs an existing copyright 
protected photograph would also infringe on that protected image. See, e.g., Hughes, 
supra note 15, at 393. (“It is important to understand that unauthorized, non-
transformative, and slavish reproduction of [an] entire photograph by a newspaper, news 
service, or television station is—and should be—an infringement of copyright.”). 
198 This is effectively what occurred in Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914). A 
photographer took a picture of a nude model entitled “Grace of Youth.” Id. at 931. He 
sold both the photograph and its copyright to the plaintiff. Id. Two years later, the 
photographer recreated the tableau of his earlier work using the same model in an 
identical pose, and took a new photograph he entitled “Cherry Ripe.” Id. at 930. The 
Court found that the later image infringed on the earlier image. Id. at 931–32. As a slavish 
copy of the tableau that was staged for the first photograph, the later photograph would 
also run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion. 
914 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:869 
 
The next evening Hiker returns to the cliff bringing with him the 
identical type of camera, film and tripod used by Photopro. Hiker 
places his tripod in the dirt markings that indicate the exact loca-
tion from which Photopro snapped his photo the previous evening. 
Choosing the identical camera angle and settings, Hiker snaps a 
picture at the moment of sunset. (Assume that atmospheric condi-
tions on the two days are identical.) Given the centrality to photo-
graphic originality of actions related to choosing a camera, film, 
camera angle, and camera settings, one might well conclude that 
Hiker has slavishly copied that which is original to Photopro’s im-
age. If so, Hiker’s photograph runs afoul of Feist’s non-copying cri-
terion and is not original.199 
It is important to point out that a photographer’s doing no 
more than pointing her camera at the exact same object or scene 
previously photographed by another photographer does not run 
afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion. In the realm of the graphic 
arts no one has a monopoly over depicting a pre-existing object or 
scene.200 The first tourist to take a photograph of the Grand Can-
yon from a newly opened scenic overlook in a national park has no 
greater copyright over her image of that natural wonder than the 
hundredth tourist who takes a photograph from the same overlook. 
Nonetheless, the first photographer’s work is entitled to “thin” 
protection: “The nature of this thin copyright may mean that the 
photograph is effectively protected from slavish, reprographic co-
pying, but has little protection against unauthorized copying of 
most elements in a derivative work.”201 
                                                                                                                            
199 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
200 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 13.03[B][2][b] (“Liability . . . cannot 
arise to the extent that the similarity between plaintiff’s and defendant’s work is that both 
graphically reproduce an object exactly as it occurs in nature.”). 
201 Hughes, supra note 15, at 392; see also SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 
F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that photographs of pre-existing objects are 
“only protected from verbatim copying”). 
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III. THE ENIGMA OF PHOTOGRAPHY: THE CAMERA’S 
AUTOMATISM AND THE PHOTOGRAPH’S 
VERISIMILITUDE DO NOT UNDERMINE  
COPYRIGHT ORIGINALITY 
We come full circle to the enigma of photography. Throughout 
its history, cultural and legal critics have focused on the two most 
distinctive attributes of the technology—the camera’s automatism 
and the image’s verisimilitude—to challenge photography as an art 
form. 
If, as argued above,202 photographic originality inheres primari-
ly in a photographer’s choices and actions that result in the place-
ment of design markings on the image’s surface, the major chal-
lenge to photographic originality is automatism. Do the mechanics 
of the camera so over-determine the appearance of the resulting 
image that the photographer is left with little opportunity to inject 
her own personality into the photograph, irrespective of her choic-
es and actions related to marking the surface? 
In contrast, because the choice of an object to photograph is, at 
most, secondarily related to a photograph’s originality, the claim of 
critics that most photographs are unoriginal because of their verisi-
militude—their facticity—is misconceived. A photograph of a hip-
popotamus is no less original because of its asserted factual nature 
than is a realistic painting of the same animal. 
The attacks on photographic originality based on automatism 
and verisimilitude are not unique to legal critics. Art theorists Di-
armuid Costello and Dawn Phillips describe “[t]hree widespread 
and contentious intuitions [that] play a role in most discussions of 
photography,” intuitions that link the camera’s automatism with 
the image’s truthfulness:203 
1) The photographic process is, in some sense, au-
tomatic. 
2) The resultant images are, in some sense, realistic. 
                                                                                                                            
202 See supra Part II.B.1. 
203 Costello & Phillips, supra note 46, at 2. 
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3) The realism of photographs, in some sense, de-
pends on the automatism of the photographic 
process.204 
They explain: 
In these formulations the term “automatic” stands 
proxy for a variety of notions used to characterise 
the photographic process, such as: mechanical, 
mind-independent, agent-less, natural, causal, phys-
ical, unmediated. The term “realistic” could be re-
placed by an equally large variety of terms, used to 
characterise the status of photographs, such as: au-
thentic, faithful, objective, truthful, accurate.205 
Separating issues of the camera’s automatism from issues of 
the image’s verisimilitude can shed light on the confusion that has 
arisen in both art theory and legal commentary over the artistic na-
ture of the photograph. Accordingly, in Part III.A. below, I con-
front the challenge based on automatism that the mechanical na-
ture of the camera precludes most photographs from satisfying 
copyright law’s threshold requirement of minimal creativity. In 
Part III.B. below, I confront the challenge based on verisimilitude 
that, because of their inherent factual nature, most photographs do 
not satisfy Feist’s requirements for originality. 
A. Automatism—The Mechanics of the Camera Do Not Defeat 
Copyright Originality206 
Philosopher Dawn Wilson explains the challenge that the cam-
era’s automatism poses to considering a photograph an artwork: 
“Automatism” is the notion that a photograph is 
the product of a nonconscious, natural, or mechani-
cal process. This being so, it is supposed that a pho-
tograph is not primarily the product of an agent’s 
conscious control, and it is inferred that an artistic 
                                                                                                                            
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Photography and automatism were the subjects of a 2012 Symposium, Agency and 
Automatism: Photography as Art Since the Sixties, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 679 (2012), and a 
2013 Symposium, 70 J. OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 1 (2013). 
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agent can have only a limited or inhibited responsi-
bility for the salient features of a photograph. The 
idea that scope for artistic intentionality is dimi-
nished by automatism has been a basis for treating 
photographs as inferior to other art forms and re-
mains a hurdle for evaluations of photography in the 
philosophy of art. 207 
The mechanics of the camera have also grounded the attack of 
legal critics on photographic originality from the moment that Bur-
row-Giles Lithographic Co. asserted in its 1884 Supreme Court 
brief that “in photography no intellectual and original labor is re-
quired.”208 
In this attack, cultural and legal critics inevitably compare pho-
tography to painting. Carol Armstrong caricatures this comparison: 
[A photograph supposedly captures] unwilled facts 
caught willy-nilly, automatically, and all at once by 
the camera without any intervention of the photo-
grapher’s agency save for the quick gesture of rais-
ing the camera and clicking the shutter. This sup-
posed automation stands in marked contrast to how 
Renaissance fresco painters must have painted the 
Passion cycles, with or without the aid of a team of 
workshop assistants: stroke by intentional 
stroke .…209 
A painting is perceived as having an intentional relationship to 
the subject that appears in the painting. Because every brushstroke 
is intentionally placed onto the canvas, the resulting image is the 
direct result of the painter’s creative mental vision. In contrast, a 
photograph has but a causal relationship to its subject. Irrespective 
of how a photographer may perceive the subject to be photo-
graphed, the mechanics of the camera assure that the resulting im-
                                                                                                                            
207 Dawn M. Wilson, Facing the Camera: Self-Portraits of Photographers as Artists, J. OF 
AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 55 (2012). 
208 Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 10. 
209 Carol Armstrong, Automatism and Agency Intertwined: A Spectrum of Photographic 
Intentionality, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 705, 706–07 (2012). 
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age “is causally determined by the photographed scene, rather than 
intentionally determined by the photographer.”210 
In thinking about photography, art theorists have recently chal-
lenged the supposed opposition between intentionality and causali-
ty and, in so doing, have questioned whether the mechanical nature 
of the camera necessarily diminishes the creativity of the photo-
graph. Costello and Phillips explain: 
The intuition that the photographic process is in 
some sense automatic is supposed to imply that the 
process takes place independently of human agency. 
It is possible for a photograph to be produced “au-
tomatically”—if, say, a curtain blown by the wind 
knocks a Polaroid camera onto the floor and trips 
the shutter. The process in cases of “accidental 
photographs” seems automatic precisely because it 
occurs without any human intervention or action: if 
any human agency were involved, the process would 
be only partly automatic. However, treating “auto-
matism” and “agency” in general as a zero-sum 
opposition is incoherent.211 
The cultural and legal attacks on photographic originality based 
on automatism are the direct result of investing overwhelming im-
portance in a single act—clicking the camera’s shutter button. But 
why should this act alone be the only act of significance to deter-
mining whether a photograph is original? Expanding the time frame 
surrounding the moment of snapping the picture reveals a much 
broader range of choices and actions that impact the image’s crea-
tivity. In fact, art theorists locate such creativity in the very same 
acts on which courts historically have relied to ground photograph-
ic originality. For example, Carol Armstrong notes that a photo-
grapher maintains control over 
                                                                                                                            
210 Costello & Lopes, supra note 44, at 2; see also Scott Walden, Objectivity in 
Photography, 45 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 258, 259 (2005) (“A photographer who is 
hallucinating that a red apple is green will nonetheless produce an image that depicts the 
apple as red. The exclusion of the photographer’s mental states renders photographs 
objective . . . .”). 
211 Costello & Phillips, supra note 46, at 15. 
2015] THE ENIGMA OF PHOTOGRAPHY 919 
 
the selection and arrangement of subject matter, 
lighting, framing, depth of field, width of aperture, 
speed of film and shutter, choice of lens, and posi-
tioning of the camera—to which can be added the 
many developing, cropping, and printing choices 
that must then be made, not to mention captioning, 
text, and other kinds of contextualization—as de-
termining the meanings that a viewer of the image 
would take away from it.212 
At the same time, scholars point out that, because an artist’s 
painting a canvas involves rote brush movements learned over 
many years, the caricatured vision that a painter’s every brush-
stroke is intentional and mediated through the artist’s mind is sub-
ject to serious challenge.213 
Perhaps the strongest response to the attack on photographic 
originality based on automatism is that it is the element of 
chance—the giving up of total control over the final image—that 
embodies what is most unique to photography as an art form. 
“[T]here is something within the photographic itself that calls for 
notions of the automatic, the arbitrary and the unwilled, the acci-
dental and the random, chance and contingency, more than other 
media such as painting.”214 Were copyright law to insist on total 
control as a necessary indicium of originality, it would be at odds 
with the contemporary art world’s embracing the creative potential 
of chance in photography. Costello and Iverson observe: “An ade-
quate conception of photographic art should provide scope for both 
highly skilled photographic practices that follow in the tradition of 
the fine arts, and for chance-inflected practices that aspire, by 
                                                                                                                            
212 Armstrong, supra note 209, at 707–08. 
213 Id. at 710–11 (“[T]he paintbrush has its own automatism, and no author of a painting 
is fully in conscious control of everything he or she does with that brush. . . . [T]he 
intentionality of the process of painting . . . can be seen to be riven with the obduracy of 
materials and the mechanicalness of applying stroke after stroke to the canvas in a learned 
routine become second nature. It is surely a different process from the decision making of 
the street photographer—more tactile than purely optical—but not because it is all 
agency and no automatism.”). 
214 Id. at 706. 
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means of the camera’s automaticity, to short-circuit artistic con-
vention and habits of mind alike.”215 
B. Verisimilitude—A Photograph Is Not a Fact 
We come to the major argument that contemporary legal critics 
level against photographic originality: most photographs are uncre-
ative facts that run afoul of the fundamental tenet that copyright 
law protects only creative expression, not facts or ideas.216 
This argument is neither new nor unique to legal critics. Based 
on the image’s verisimilitude—its accuracy and utter truthful-
ness—mid-nineteenth century critics questioned whether a photo-
graph could be considered fine art. For example, in 1859, art critic 
Francis Frith claimed that photography was “ . . . too truthful. It 
insists upon giving us ‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth.’”217 Professor Justin Hughes argues that little has 
changed in 150 years: “This understanding of photographs as sim-
ple conveyors of truth is still very much alive, not just in our gro-
cery store tabloids (yes, that’s what she looks like without make-
                                                                                                                            
215 Costello & Iverson, supra note 35, at 693. 
216 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (“This 
Court has long recognized that the fact/expression dichotomy limits severely the scope of 
protection in fact-based works.”). Some courts and commentators have questioned 
whether copyright law’s distinction between fact and expression even makes sense when 
applied to graphic works. See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 
455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Noting that “[i]t is true that an axiom of copyright law is that 
copyright does not protect ‘ideas,’ only their expression,” the court continues: 
In the visual arts, the distinction breaks down. For one thing, it is 
impossible in most cases to speak of the particular “idea” captured, 
embodied, or conveyed by a work of art because every observer will 
have a different interpretation. Furthermore, it is not clear that there 
is any real distinction between the idea in a work of art and its 
expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is to depict a 
particular subject in a particular way. 
Id. at 458. See also id. at 461 (“In the context of photography, the idea/expression 
distinction is not useful or relevant.”); see also Teresa M. Bruce, In the Language of 
Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequately Account for Photography, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 
93, 97, 127 (2012) (“In fact, a photograph’s facts and expression are, arguably, inseparably 
wed. . . . For photographic works, especially straight photographs, the problem of 
untangling facts and expression is particularly thorny.”). 
217 Frith, supra note 11, at 72, in MARIEN PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 77. 
2015] THE ENIGMA OF PHOTOGRAPHY 921 
 
up), but also in much of twentieth century intellectual discourse on 
photography.”218 
Looking to the photograph’s “fact bearing capacity,”219 “in-
formation laden nature,”220 and “fact-recording nature,”221 
Hughes launches a head-on assault on photographic originality. He 
concludes that “a large percentage of the world’s photographs are 
likely not protected by American copyright law because the images 
lack even a modicum of creativity. . . . [W]e have probably already 
crossed a threshold beyond which most of the world’s photograph-
ic images are not truly protected by copyright.”222 Because Hughes 
is the most articulate skeptic who challenges photographic original-
ity based on the factual nature of photographs, I will focus on his 
arguments. 
For Hughes, most photographs fail to satisfy Feist’s minimal 
creativity criterion because they merely capture a “preexisting real-
ity.”223 Hughes analogizes photographs to databases and, as such, 
argues that they are entitled at most to thin protection for the se-
lection and arrangement of the facts that appear in the image.224 
Hughes grants that a few photographs are entitled to full copy-
right protection as original creative art works. In the spirit of Bur-
row-Giles, he would extend protection to images that result from 
the photographer’s “arranging the tableau.”225 “[C]reating the 
scene or subject captured in the photograph, should be the first 
category of originality in a photograph because it occurs before any 
photographic processes and is independent of any decisions con-
cerning photographic equipment. . . . [C]omposing and posing can 
form a significant basis for copyright.”226 
                                                                                                                            
218 Hughes, supra note 15, at 344. 
219 Id. at 348. 
220 Id. at 349. 
221 Id. at 355. 
222 Id. at 374. 
223 Id. at 361. 
224 See, e.g., id. at 350 (“Seeing the parallel between photographs and databases has 
great dividends for those working in copyright law. It is no accident that the strongest, 
most stable bases for copyright protection of a photograph are selection and arrangement—
the Feist foundation for copyright in compilations of data.”). 
225 Id. at 412. 
226 Id. at 402. 
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With respect to the vast majority of photographs that merely 
capture an “independent reality,” however, Hughes argues that 
photography is being used only for a “naïve or descriptive func-
tion,” 227 not a creative one. There is “an insufficient ‘trace of the 
personal vision of whoever is behind the camera’” for such images 
to be considered original.228 
Hughes’s arguments echo in important respects those of art 
theorist Roger Scruton. In a seminal work published in 1983,229 
Scruton asserts that, because of the mechanical nature of the tech-
nology, any aesthetic interest in a photograph “appl[ies] to features 
of the object photographed, not to features of the photograph it-
self. . . . Photographs may serve as conduits for aesthetic interest, 
but they cannot be objects of aesthetic interest in their own 
right . . . .”230 Scruton argues that “if one finds a photograph beau-
tiful, it is because one finds something beautiful in its subject.”231 
In a similar vein, Hughes believes that the vast majority of photo-
graphs merely document factual information about their content. 
Most photographs qua photographs have no aesthetic value that is 
worthy of copyright protection. 
The core of Hughes’s argument that most photographs are un-
creative facts unworthy of copyright protection is encapsulated in 
the following statement: “It is important to recognize that where 
the content of the photograph has an independent reality, and the 
photographer seeks only to achieve and does in fact achieve an ac-
curate representation of that independent reality, there is a good 
chance that the photograph has no copyright protection at all.”232 
I will respond to Professor Hughes by arguing first that the con-
tent of a photograph—what a viewer perceives in the image—rarely 
impacts photographic originality.233 I will then argue that a photo-
graph of any real world object that has an “independent reality” is 
                                                                                                                            
227 Id. at 367, 381. 
228 Id. at 381. 
229 Roger Scruton, Photography and Representation, in THE AESTHETIC 
UNDERSTANDING: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND CULTURE 102 (1983). 
230 Dominic McIver Lopes, The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency, 112 MIND 433, 
435 (2003) (discussing Scruton’s theory of photography). 
231 Scruton, supra note 229, at 114. 
232 Hughes, supra note 15, at 374. 
233 See infra Part III.B.1. 
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no more a fact than a painting of the same object.234 I will then sug-
gest that, contra Hughes and Scruton, a photograph of a real world 
object—“an independent reality”—can hold an aesthetic interest 
independent of any aesthetic interest in the actual object itself.235 
Finally, I will suggest that a photograph’s accuracy does not detract 
from its creativity for purposes of photographic originality.236 
1. Attacking a Photograph’s Copyrightability Based on the 
Image’s Content Locates Originality in the Wrong 
Place 
I return to this Article’s fundamental premise: a photograph is 
a depiction with two folds, the first relating to the image’s surface 
design markings and the second relating to the content a viewer 
perceives in the image. Photographic originality inheres primarily 
in the first fold. What is perceived in the image, its content, rarely 
impacts copyright originality. 
Hughes claims that, because their content “has an independent 
reality,” most photographs are mere facts unworthy of copyright 
protection.237 But focusing on a photograph’s content—the second 
fold of depiction—locates copyright originality in the wrong place. 
That argument ignores entirely the importance of a photograph’s 
surface design markings to assessing originality. 
Given Hughes’s focus on a photograph’s content, it is clear 
why he limits copyright protection to instances in which the photo-
grapher stages the tableau that a viewer perceives in the image. 
Those are the rare instances in which the second fold of depiction 
affirmatively impacts originality. But overlooking the photograph’s 
surface design markings and the photographer’s relationship to 
those markings keeps Hughes from appreciating the most impor-
tant way in which a photographer infuses her image with creative 
personality.238 
                                                                                                                            
234 See infra Part III.B.2. 
235 See infra Part III.B.3. 
236 See infra Part III.B.4. 
237 Hughes, supra note 15, at 374. 
238 In a previous article, I offered an explanation as to why viewers tend to ignore a 
photograph’s surface design markings when looking at photographic reproductions of art. 
Turning to recent art and visual theory, I argued, 
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Analogizing a photograph to a factual database makes sense on-
ly if originality depends on the various objects that a viewer perce-
ives in the image. It is those objects that are the supposed facts that 
the photographer selects and arranges in choosing a perspective 
from which to shoot the picture. In contrast, if what matters most 
to copyright originality are the photographer’s creative choices and 
actions related to the placement of surface design markings, there 
are no facts to be selected and arranged. The analogy to a database 
collapses. 
2. A Photograph is Not Always More Truthful Than a 
Painting 
Perhaps Professor Hughes would challenge the underlying 
premise of this Article that one can separate the two folds of depic-
tion when considering photographic originality. He might argue 
that, in contrast to other graphic artworks, photographs are unique 
in that they always capture truths about the world. A photograph’s 
surface design markings are inextricably linked to the image’s dis-
playing the facts that a viewer perceives in a photograph. It is this 
attribute that dooms their creativity. 
Art theorists cast this debate in terms of whether a photograph 
has an epistemic advantage over other graphic works. A photograph 
has an epistemic advantage if it is more likely than other graphic 
images to lead a viewer to true beliefs about the world.239 Costello 
and Phillips note that it is often assumed that, if a photograph has 
such an advantage, it undermines its artistic nature: “At first blush 
photography’s epistemic and aesthetic value certainly seem to be in 
competition: the more photography is said to be epistemically privi-
leged, in virtue of being an objective, mind-independent record of 
the facts, the less capacity it seems to have for aesthetic value . . . 
                                                                                                                            
a viewer tends to look through [a photograph] as though it were 
transparent, and see only the [object] depicted.… The viewer erases 
from his mind the fact that he is actually looking at a photograph with 
unique photographic attributes—erasing even the existence of the 
photographer responsible for that image, including the range of 
artistic judgments and choices that went into producing the 
photographic reproduction. 
Kogan, supra note 194, at 447–48 (emphasis added). 
239 See Walden, supra note 210, at 261–62. 
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.”240 This assumption underlies Professor Hughes’s argument that 
a photograph’s factual nature undermines its creative nature. 
There is little doubt that viewers believe photographs to be 
more accurate depictions of the world than handmade images such 
as paintings. This is clearly reflected in the courtroom where a pho-
tograph of a crime scene carries greater weight than a police 
sketcher’s rendering of the same scene. In fact, most photographs 
do have an epistemic advantage over most handmade images. But is 
it the case that photographs are always more truthful—more fac-
tual—than handmade images, and thereby inherently less creative? 
The answer is no.241 
The fact that, as a result of the technology’s mechanical nature, 
we always see some real world object through the photograph (the 
attribute that Dominic Lopes describes as a photograph’s “trans-
parency”)242 does not equate to the assertion that every photo-
graph is factually accurate. Lopes explains: 
Nor should the claim that photographs are transpa-
rent be confused with a claim about their accuracy. 
A photograph is necessarily accurate in the sense 
that it carries information by means of a causal 
process. In another sense, a photograph is inaccu-
rate, since it may cause or dispose one to have false 
beliefs about the objects photographed. A colour 
photograph of a red apple carries information about 
the apple’s redness, though it may carry the infor-
mation by having a colour indistinguishable from 
that of an orange seen in ordinary light, with the re-
                                                                                                                            
240 Costello & Phillips, supra note 46, at 2. 
241 Philosopher Barbara Savedoff explains: 
In truth, photographs can be far from objective in how they present a subject; the 
photographer’s choice of camera angle, lighting, and framing all influence the way in 
which the subject will be seen. Furthermore, the characteristics of the medium itself—its 
two-dimensionality, the delimitation of its image, the use of black and white—all 
contribute to a divergence between what we see in a photograph and what we would have 
seen in person. Nevertheless, our awareness of all these factors does not change the way 
we see photographs—as having a special connection to reality. 
BARBARA SAVEDOFF, TRANSFORMING IMAGES 87 (2000). 
242 Lopes, supra note 188, at 438. (“To say that photographs are transparent is to say 
that we see through them.”). 
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sult that we are liable to believe falsely that the apple 
is orange in colour.243 
Other ways in which a photograph may inaccurately depict an 
object or scene include: the photographer may choose to use a fish-
eye or wide-angle lens that distorts the image; the photographer 
may choose to use a colored filter that distorts the actual color of 
the image’s subject matter; the photographer may choose to use 
dramatic lighting to illuminate the subject matter, creating shadows 
or bright areas that distort appearances; the photographer may 
choose to take the photograph from an unusual angle that makes it 
difficult to gain accurate information about the image’s subject 
matter; the photograph may be taken from an airplane, providing 
little information to the viewer about the subject matter; the pho-
tograph may be taken during a snowstorm, obscuring and distorting 
much of the subject matter’s detail. Any of these choices by the 
photographer decreases the facticity of the photograph—the truth-
fulness of the information conveyed to a viewer about the content 
of the image.244 
In sum, though photographs are generally a more reliable 
source of accurate information about the world than other graphic 
images, this is not always or inevitably the case. In other words, 
there is no necessary connection between photography and truth. 
On occasion, a photograph is not a fact in the sense that Hughes 
suggests. It can lead a viewer to create false beliefs about the world. 
In contrast, some handmade images can lead a viewer to develop 
more truthful beliefs than a photograph of the same subject matter. 
Examples include drawings of birds by John James Audubon245 or 
                                                                                                                            
243 Id. at 440. 
244 Once one moves beyond pre-shutter choices to post-shutter manipulation—either in 
the darkroom or on a computer—the seeming inevitable accuracy of the photograph is 
cast into further doubt. Were the photographer to use the wrong mix of chemicals in the 
dark room, to crop the image in a strange way, or to Photoshop the image, obviously the 
facticity of the photograph would be severely compromised. Scott Walden recounts the 
case of a Los Angeles Times photojournalist who was summarily fired after admitting to 
digitally combining two images into a single photograph for the front page of the 
newspaper. Scott Walden, Truth in Photography, in PHOTOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY: 
ESSAYS ON THE PENCIL OF NATURE 91 (Scott Walden ed., 2008). 
245 John James Audubon (1785–1851) was a preeminent wildlife artist for much of the 
early nineteenth century. Born in Saint Domingue (now Haiti), he was sent to the United 
States at eighteen, settling in Pennsylvania, where he hunted, studied, and drew birds. 
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paintings of elevated highways in New York City by photorealist 
painter Rackstraw Downes.246 In both instances, because of the dis-
torting effect of shadow, lighting, etc., few photographs capture the 
exactitude of detail that appears in such handmade images. 
Few would claim that a photorealist painting by Downes is un-
original because it is an uncreative “fact.” A photograph of the 
same subject matter is no more a fact than the painting. Both are 
depictions. As such, if either is original it is because of the artist’s 
creative choices and actions in placing design markings on the pic-
ture’s surface—not because the depiction is or is not a fact. 
3. Point-and-Shoot Photographs of Real World Objects 
Can Possess Unique Aesthetic Interest Worthy of 
Copyright Protection 
Echoing arguments of art theorist Roger Scruton,247 Justin 
Hughes argues that a photograph that merely portrays an “inde-
pendent reality” has no aesthetic value worthy of copyright protec-
tion. The function of such an image is purely “naïve or descrip-
tive”248 and therefore there is “an insufficient ‘trace of the person-
al vision of whoever is behind the camera’ for us to grant copyright 
under the standards in United States and European copyright 
law.”249 
This argument assumes that seeing a real world object in a pho-
tograph offers no aesthetic value above and beyond seeing that 
same object face-to-face. The “naïve or descriptive” photograph is 
                                                                                                                            
John James Audubon, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y, http://www.audubon.org/content/john-
james-audubon (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
246 Rackstraw Downes (born 1939) is a British-born realist painter and author. His oil 
paintings, depicting industry and the environment, are notable for meticulous detail 
accumulated during months of en plein air sessions and elongated compositions with 
complex perspective. Biographical Summary—Rackstraw Downes, CROWN POINT PRESS, 
http://www.crownpoint.com/artists/rackstraw-downes/biographical-summary (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2015). 
247 Scruton, supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
248 Hughes, supra note 15, at 381 (“[I]t seems that the claim that many—perhaps 
most—of the world’s photographs are completely unprotected by copyright arises simply 
because ‘[i]n most uses of the camera, the photograph’s naïve or descriptive function is 
paramount.’” (quoting SONTAG, supra note 19, at 132–33)). 
249 Id. 
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purely documentary and offers no aesthetic interest independent of 
an aesthetic interest in the object documented. 
This argument is based on a flawed assumption. As Dominic 
Lopes notes, “[s]eeing an object through a photograph is not iden-
tical to seeing it face-to-face.”250 In fact, seeing an object through a 
photograph may “arouse an interest not satisfied by seeing the 
same object face-to-face.”251 What is the unique aesthetic interest 
that can be aroused by seeing an object through a photograph that 
is above and beyond seeing the object face-to-face? 
Lopes suggests five factors related to seeing an object through a 
photograph that potentially contribute aesthetic value over and 
above seeing that same object face-to-face: 
1. “[P]hotographs capture their objects fixed at a moment in 
time. . . . Rudolf Arnheim writes that in photographs ‘the 
rapid course of events is found to contain hidden moments 
which, when isolated and fixed, reveal new and different 
meanings.’”252 
2. Because the actual object seen in the photograph is generally 
absent when viewing the image, “photographic seeing 
through bridges distances, either spatial or temporal.… Ob-
viously, nostalgia for an object cannot be evoked by seeing it 
face-to-face.”253 
3. Seeing through a photograph “isolates the photographed ob-
ject from the context it would normally be seen to inhabit. 
With change of context comes a change in the properties 
the object itself may be seen to have. . . . Seeing through de-
contextualizes.”254 
4. “[T]he presence of a camera is an essential part of the con-
text in which we see an object photographically—what we 
see through a photograph is always before a camera. More-
over, the camera sometimes intrudes upon or disturbs what 
                                                                                                                            
250 Lopes, supra note 188, at 441. 
251 Id. at 442. 
252 Id. at 442–43. (quoting Rudolf Arnheim, Splendor and Misery of the Photographer, in 
NEW ESSAYS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART 118 (1986)). 
253 Id. at 443. 
254 Id. 
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it photographs, especially when it is a person, thereby 
showing it in a way inaccessible to the naked eye.”255 
5. “[S]eeing photographs is typically twofold in the sense that 
it melds seeing the photographed object and its properties 
with seeing the photograph itself and its properties.… Pho-
tographic seeing through is always simultaneous with plain 
vanilla seeing of a photograph.”256 
He concludes: 
An aesthetic interest in a photograph is properly an 
interest in the photograph itself, not in some other 
object. Since photographs are transparent, an inter-
est in a photograph as a photograph is an interest in 
it as a vehicle for seeing through it to the photo-
graphed scene. This is not an interest limited to the 
scene itself; it is an interest in the scene as it is seen 
through the photograph. Thus our aesthetic interest 
in a photograph . . . is an interest in the photograph 
as it enables seeing through. It is an interest that 
photographs can foster and satisfy and face-to face 
seeing cannot.257 
For Hughes, ordinary point-and-shoot photographs are aesthet-
ically empty vessels useful only for carrying information about ob-
jects in the world. By suggesting that there is unique aesthetic value 
to be gained from viewing a real world object through a photo-
graph, value unavailable from simply viewing that object face-to-
face, Lopes’s arguments go a long way toward undermining 
Hughes’s argument. 
Of course, given Bleistein’s admonition against courts making 
aesthetic judgments,258 Lopes’s suggestion that unique aesthetic 
value can be derived from viewing objects through photographs is 
                                                                                                                            
255 Id. 
256 Lopes suggests that these five features of seeing an object through a photograph lend 
themselves to supporting what he calls “documentary aesthetics”: “What may be called a 
documentary aesthetics has two dimensions. One measures the authenticity, accuracy or 
truthfulness of a photograph; the other measures its promotion of revelatory, 
transformative or defamilarizing seeing.” Id. at 445 
257 Id. 
258 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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entirely beside the point when it comes to determining copyright 
originality. Under current doctrine, such determinations are 
founded only in the photographer’s pre-shutter choices and ac-
tions.259 Given current copyright law’s utter lack of criteria for as-
sessing the aesthetic value of a photograph, this Article seconds the 
current approach.260 
Nonetheless, for those (like Hughes) who believe that the bar 
for copyright originality should be raised,261 Lopes’s analysis offers 
an intriguing glimpse into how this might be accomplished. To be-
gin with, were the law to base determinations of originality on aes-
thetic quality,262 criteria for such determinations would necessarily 
be unique to each genre of artwork. What makes a photograph aes-
thetically valuable is fundamentally different from what makes a 
painting aesthetically valuable, and such differences would have to 
be integrated into a new doctrine of originality 
As an example of how Lopes’s factors might aid in assessing a 
photograph’s originality, consider Thomas Mangelsen’s well-
known photograph, Catch of the Day, which depicts a salmon jump-
ing into the mouth of a brown bear in Katmai National Park, 
Alaska. In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.,263 Judge Lewis Kaplan 
suggests that this photograph is original by virtue of timing: “[A] 
person may create a worthwhile photograph by being at the right 
place at the right time.”264 In so doing, he bases originality on the 
photographer’s choices and actions, not on aesthetic attributes of 
the photograph. 
                                                                                                                            
259 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
260 See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 1490 (“[A] definitive account of originality as a legal 
construct is not possible and that, as a result, the current low threshold for originality 
should be maintained. Under this analysis, most photographs, so long as they comply with 
certain requirements, should be granted protection, at the very least, against exact 
copying (for example, through digital copying and pasting).”). 
261 See also Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 457–58 (2009) 
(arguing in favor of heightening the creativity requirement for copyright protection). 
262 See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005) (arguing that, 
despite Bleistein’s admonition, aesthetic judgments regularly enter into legal 
decisionmaking); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Theory and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
247 (1998) (arguing that “judges should be conscious of aesthetics when deciding 
copyright cases”). 
263 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (2005). 
264 Id. (quoting 1 LADDIE, supra note 154, § 4.57, p. 229). 
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Lopes’s list of factors offers one possible approach for recog-
nizing the attributes of Mangelsen’s photograph that make it aes-
thetically interesting. In accord with Lopes’s first factor, by isolat-
ing a fixed moment in time, the photograph reveals “new and dif-
ferent meanings” that a viewer watching the live event would in-
evitably miss—that very moment the fish enters the mouth of a 
bear. Similarly, along the lines of Lopes’s third factor, the photo-
graph decontextualizes the bear, the fish, and the water from their 
normal movements in time and space and, in so doing, presents an 
other-worldly frozen image divorced from any imaginable daily ex-
perience. 
But, alas, we live in a post-Bleistein world. Hughes’s and the 
Mannion court’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,265 
modern courts continue to make determinations of photographic 
originality based solely on choices and actions of the photographer, 
not on aesthetic attributes of the photograph. Nonetheless, intro-
ducing Lopes’s factors related to identifying such attributes points 
to an important lesson. Were copyright law to abandon Bleistein’s 
admonition against aesthetic judgments, determinations of photo-
graphic originality would not turn on whether an image is a “fact” 
or portrays an “independent reality.” Rather, such determinations 
would look to attributes that make particular photographs worthy 
of aesthetic contemplation. Included within such original images 
would be point-and-shoot photographs of real world objects as well 
as photographs of constructed tableaus. The facticity of an image 
would be irrelevant to a new jurisprudence of photographic origi-
nality. 
4. Photographic Accuracy Is a Creative Choice 
Professor Hughes further challenges photographic originality 
because most photographs portray only an “accurate representa-
tion of [an] independent reality.”266 He is not alone in this chal-
lenge,267 which is grounded in the following assumption: Taking 
                                                                                                                            
265 See supra note 184. 
266 Hughes, supra note 15, at 374. 
267 Professor Daniel Gervais similarly argues that “a photographer trying to take a 
technically perfect picture is not making creative choices.” Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes 
Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 956 (2002). 
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accurate photographs of real world objects is simply what cameras 
do by default—there is “no room for creative choices.”268 As such, 
the act of pointing and shooting a camera is devoid of even the mi-
nimal creativity required for copyright originality. It is only when a 
photographer actively poses a scene or chooses to move away from 
mere accuracy through creative camera adjustments or choice of 
perspective that a photograph enters the realm of originality.269 
I want to step back into history to challenge the assumption 
that photographic accuracy is inherently devoid of minimal creativ-
ity. Beginning in the late nineteenth century until the 1920s, a pho-
tographic movement known as “Pictorialism” became popular 
among professional and amateur photographers alike, a movement 
that encouraged the “moving away from faithful depiction toward 
more evocative and expressive photographs.”270 In part a reaction 
against what was viewed as vulgar commercial photography, 
Pictorialist photographers favored scenes infused 
with fog and shadows. In contrast to their simple 
subjects, they strove for tonal complexity, choosing 
techniques such as platinum printing, which yielded 
abundant soft, middle-gray tones.…Their results 
were in obvious visual opposition to the sharp black-
and-white contrasts of the commercial print. Picto-
rialist photographs were frequently printed on tex-
tured paper, unlike the glossy surface of commercial 
photographs .…271 
                                                                                                                            
268 Id. at 978. 
269 Professors Hughes and Gervais both base their skepticism of the originality of 
accurate photography on the court’s decision in Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel, 25 F. 
Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Judge Kaplan noted, 
[O]ne need not deny the creativity inherent in the art of photography 
to recognize that a photograph which is no more than a copy of the 
work of another as exact as science and technology permit lacks 
originality. That is not to say such a feat is trivial, simply not original. 
Id. See Gervais, supra note 267, at 979–80; Hughes, supra note 15, at 374–75. I have 
challenged the reasoning of Bridgeman in another article. See Kogan, supra note 194, at 
471. 
270 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 170 (setting forth the history of 
Pictorialism). 
271 Id. 
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Responding to the perceived automatism of the camera, “[o]ne 
Pictorialist asserted that ‘the photographer is not helpless before 
the mechanical means at his disposal. He can master them as he 
may choose, and he can make the lens see with his eyes, can make 
the plate receive his impressions.’”272 In light of broad interest in 
Pictorialism, “[c]ommerical producers rushed to make soft-focus 
lenses and textured photographic papers for amateur use.”273 
Given the popularity of Pictorialism at the turn of the twentieth 
century, a photographer wishing to purchase a camera would have 
to choose whether to purchase one with a non-distortive, accurate 
lens or one with a soft-focus lens. I suggest that either decision 
would properly be described as a creative choice, one that would 
significantly impact the appearance of the resulting images. 
Little has changed today. A photographer’s decision as to the 
type of image to create—accurate and non-distorted, or artsy—
begins at the moment a photographer purchases a camera and one 
or more lenses. Though most photographers purchase convention-
al lenses that produce accurate photographs, some purchase fish-
eye, wide-angle or other lenses that in some way distort the accura-
cy of the depiction. To argue that a photographer’s choice to use a 
distortive lens satisfies Feist’s minimal creativity standard,274 while 
the choice to use a non-distortive, conventional lens does not, 
seems entirely arbitrary. Rather, a photographer’s opting for one 
type of lens rather than another directly impacts how design mark-
ings will be laid down on the surface of the image, the issue most 
relevant to copyright originality. Choosing to shoot an accurate 
photograph is as much a choice of photographic style as choosing 
to shoot a distorted picture.275 
                                                                                                                            
272 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
273 Id. at 171. 
274 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (explaining that 
the “minimal degree of creativity” standard is “extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice”). 
275 See MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at xiv (“Because photography was 
thought not to have an inherent style of its own, it quickly became synonymous with the 
making and collecting of objective images. Yet it is important to remember that the 
absence of style—stylessness—is a style in its own right. When it appears, it points to the 
expectations of the photographer and of the image’s anticipated audiences.”). 
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Imagine the following: An amateur photographer, having stu-
died Pictorialist photography in an art history class, decides to take 
photographs of Buckingham Palace on a foggy night. She begins by 
shooting a very out-of-focus image of the building. She then takes a 
series of photographs in which she slowly brings the building into 
focus. In the last photograph of the series, the building is in sharp 
focus and a viewer can readily detect minute details of the struc-
ture. Is the final photograph, “an accurate representation of [an] 
independent reality,”276 entitled to less copyright protection than 
the out-of-focus photographs? Why is that photograph any less the 
result of the photographer’s creative decision-making than the ear-
lier images? 
Perhaps at the end of the day, the brunt of Hughes’s attack is 
being leveled at the vast majority of today’s photographs taken us-
ing autofocus point-and-shoot cameras. In such cases, a photo-
grapher’s opportunities to manipulate the camera are greatly re-
stricted and, accordingly, it could be argued that such images slip 
beneath Feist’s threshold of minimal creativity. In fact, the photo-
grapher behind a point-and-shoot camera does make certain, albeit 
limited, creative choices. To begin with, she chooses to express 
herself using a camera rather than, say, a paintbrush. 277 Moreover, 
she chooses a point-and-shoot camera knowing that it will take ac-
curate, rather than distorted, images. Having done so, she then 
chooses an object or scene at which to point the camera, and then 
chooses the moment at which to depress the shutter button. Why is 
a point-and-shoot photographer any less creative than, say, an un-
trained weekend painter who attempts to paint landscapes? 
Assuming that courts continue to obey Bleistein’s admonition 
against evaluating aesthetic quality, raising the bar for photographic 
originality would require that courts identify which pre-shutter 
choices and actions are, alone or in combination, creative enough 
to satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity requirement. In all likelihood 
there would be unanimous agreement that a photographer’s acts of 
                                                                                                                            
276 Hughes, supra note 15, at 374. 
277 Hughes dismisses amateur photographers as inherently less creative than amateurs 
engaging in other arts: “Photography . . . allows people untalented in drawing or painting 
to create visual images they might otherwise imagine but be unable to create.” Hughes, 
supra note 15, at 368. 
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posing and staging the tableau carry the image over that threshold. 
But how should courts judge the relevance to originality of the fol-
lowing camera-related choices by a photographer? 
 Choosing a distorting fish-eye lens to 
achieve a special effect; 
 Adjusting a telephoto lens to make the 
subject matter appear closer; 
 Adjusting a conventional lens to take an out-
of-focus picture; 
 Adjusting a conventional lens to take an in-
focus picture; 
 Using a pink filter over the lens; 
 Adjusting the camera’s exposure setting to 
take an over-exposed shot; 
 Waiting for a dog to walk in front of the 
camera’s field of vision before clicking the 
shutter button; 
 Choosing to point the camera at one statue 
rather than another; or 
 Choosing an unconventional angle from 
which to shoot a photograph. 
I obviously could go on and on. The point is that trying to iden-
tify which pre-shutter choices and actions are or are not creative 
enough to satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity requirement would be 
an exercise in arbitrariness. 
Perhaps we should focus, instead, on the mental profile of a 
photographer rather than her pre-shutter actions. Hughes suggests 
that copyright protection might be extended to photographs that 
merely capture a “preexisting reality” if they are the result of a 
photographer’s “intentional program”278 involving a photograph-
                                                                                                                            
278 Hughes, supra note 15, at 416 (“If we eliminate human agency from the preexisting 
subject of the photograph so that we now have a photograph of something that is natural 
or random, then we may find another important distinction between photographs that 
capture slices of reality as part of an ‘intentional program’ and photographs that are not 
part of an intentional program. By intentional program, I mean the expeditions of Ansel 
Adams, the nighttime excursions of Brassai, every time Mannie Garcia goes out on 
assignment, and every occasion when a photographer wanders around a city in search of 
interesting imagery.”). 
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er’s exerting a “deliberate effort to be creative.”279 But how is a 
court to determine whether a photographer had the appropriate 
mindset to deem her resulting image copyright protectable? Many 
an amateur photographer on vacation lifts her camera with a clear 
intention to shoot a beautiful and novel photograph of Niagara 
Falls—and, on occasion, some succeed. As Mary Warner Marien 
observes, “aesthetic experimentation and self-expression are not 
limited to art photography, but encompass all genres, including 
amateur and casual photography, as evidenced on the flourishing 
Internet-based camera-phone galleries.”280 Looking to a photo-
grapher’s intentions to ground the originality of un-staged photo-
graphs is also an exercise in arbitrariness. 
In the end, for lack of workable and non-arbitrary standards, 
photographic copyrightability should remain open to all photo-
graphs taken by a camera behind which is a warm body that can in-
fuse a modicum of personality into the resulting image.281 
CONCLUSION 
From the moment that the Supreme Court first considered 
whether photographs merit copyright protection in 1884, the cam-
era’s automatism and the image’s verisimilitude—the enigmatic 
features of photography—have placed roadblocks in the way of un-
derstanding how a photograph can be considered a creative art-
work. Looking to these two features of the technology, contempo-
rary legal skeptics claim that most photographs are undeserving of 
copyright protection because they inevitably capture uncreative 
facts—in Professor Hughes’s words, “the automated representa-
tion of reality.”282 
                                                                                                                            
279 Id. at 400–01. 
280 MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at xv. 
281 I agree with Professor Hughes that photographs taken by surveillance cameras, 
satellite systems, New York taxicab cameras, and similar devices undirected by a human 
personality should not be protected by copyright law. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 
380. I also agree that photographs accidently taken by a monkey are probably not 
protected by copyright law. Id. at 373–74. 
282 Hughes, supra note 15, at 343. 
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This Article proposes that understanding a photograph as a de-
piction with two folds283 can shed considerable light on the copy-
rightability of such images and go a long way toward defusing the 
enigma of photography as it impacts the law. A photograph’s origi-
nality inheres primarily in a photographer’s choices and actions 
that result in the placement of surface design markings, the first 
fold of depiction. In contrast, the object that a viewer perceives in 
the image, depiction’s second fold, rarely impacts originality. 
Accordingly, the claim of legal skeptics that most photographs 
are uncreative facts locates photographic originality in the wrong 
place—in what a viewer sees in the image, depiction’s second fold. 
If, instead, originality is understood as based primarily on the pho-
tographer’s creative choices and actions in placing surface design 
markings (depiction’s first fold), the attack on a photograph’s ori-
ginality based on its inevitably being an uncreative fact collapses. 
This Article also argues that, because it lacks workable criteria for 
judging the aesthetic value of photographs, copyright law should 
continue to view expansively and generously the range of a photo-
grapher’s creative choices and actions that can ground photograph-
ic originality. 
 
                                                                                                                            
283 See generally WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 213–14. 
